Arbitration appeal http://www.zimlii.org/ en Mapondera and 55 Others v Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Holdings Limited (81 of 81) [2022] ZWSC 81 (14 July 2022); http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2022/81 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mapondera and 55 Others v Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Holdings Limited (81 of 81) [2022] ZWSC 81 (14 July 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2236" hreflang="x-default">Appeal (EMPLOYMENT)</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1454" hreflang="en">Arbitration awards</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2104" hreflang="x-default">Dismissal</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 07/25/2022 - 07:48</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2022/81/2022-zwsc-81.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=45121">2022-zwsc-81.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2022/81/2022-zwsc-81.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=653734">2022-zwsc-81.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Judgment No. SC 81/22</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Case No. SC 565/19</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Ref Case No. LC/H/82/11</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">REPORTABLE</span></span></span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">        (67)</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">EDMORE     MAPONDERA     AND     55     OTHERS</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">FREDA     REBECCA     GOLD     MINE     HOLDINGS     LIMITED</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAVANGIRA JA, BHUNU JA &amp; CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE: 3 JULY 2021 AND 14 JULY 2022</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A. K. Maguchu, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for the appellants</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T. Mpofu, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for the respondent</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">BHUNU JA:</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">INTRODUCTION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]        This is a partial appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court, (the court <i>a quo)</i> LC/H/2/19 dated 7 February 2019. The appeal is against the court <i>a quo’s</i> ruling on the question of citation of the parties and the arbitrator’s failure to award damages as an alternative to reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        The appeal was initially set-down for hearing on 11 September 2020 whereupon it was removed from the roll by consent of the parties to consider placing it before a full bench comprising a panel of 5 judges in terms of s 3 of the Supreme Court Act [<i>Chapter 7:13</i>].</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        Upon due consideration of the nature and complexity of the appeal, the learned presiding judge  determined that there was no need to set up a full bench comprising 5 judges to deliberate over the appeal as it was eminently capable of resolution by a three panel bench as previously constituted. The appeal was then set down for hearing before the same panel of judges on 16 June 2021.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CASE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]        The 56 appellants were employed by the respondent Freda Rebecca Mine Holdings Limited in various capacities at its mine in Bindura. Owing to virulent economic hardships at the time, the respondent ceased its mining operations sometime in 2008 without terminating the appellants’ respective contracts of employment.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        Sometime in 2009 the respondent sought to resuscitate its mining operations. In doing so it unilaterally sought to reengage the appellants on inferior contracts different from those obtaining as at the time it ceased operations in 2008. A dispute then arose concerning the appropriate terms of employment upon resumption of mining operations  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        Following failure to resolve the dispute the respondent arbitrarily wrote to the appellants terminating their original contracts of employment. The termination letters were written on a standard letterhead bearing the name <b>FREDA REBECCA GOLD MINE. </b>The letters were signed by one T Chivonivoni who designated himself/herself as the <b>GENERAL MANAGER- FREDA REBECCA GOLD MINE. </b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        Dissatisfied by the turn of events, the appellants took the dispute to the designated agent. The designated agent referred the dispute to conciliation. Upon failure of the conciliation process the conciliator issued a certificate of no settlement and completed a Reference to Arbitration on a standard form in which he designated the parties as, <b><i>“Freda Rebecca Mine alleged unfair labour practice of E Mapondera and 60 others</i></b><i>”</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a>. The reference form is dated 12 May 2010. It is common cause that the proper citation of the respondent as a party to legal proceedings ought to have been <b>Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Holdings Limited.   </b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">TERMS OF REFERENCE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The arbitrator’s terms of reference were, “To determine whether the dismissal of E. Mapondera and 60 others was lawful or not.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        At the hearing before the arbitrator the respondent took the preliminary objection that apart from Edmond Mapondera the rest of the remaining appellants had no <i>locus standi</i> because their names had not been listed as claimants and E Mapondera was not authorised to represent them.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      Counsel for the appellants argued that the respondent had always been aware that the case involved 61 employees whose identities had not been placed in issue at conciliation stage. It was only at the arbitration stage that the respondent belatedly sought to make it an issue. During the course of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator was then provided with a list of the concerned employees comprising a total of 58 claimants. The list of the claimants who were party to the proceedings was availed to the respondent</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The arbitrator dismissed the objection <i>in limine</i> on the ground that the appellants had a real and substantial interest in the matter and that right from the initiation of the legal proceedings the respondent knew the identity of its adversaries. Having dismissed the preliminary objection, the arbitrator proceeded to make an award in favour of E Mapondera and 57 others on 12 January 2011.  The award was couched in the following terms:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.          That the claimants are hereby reinstated to their positions without loss of salary and benefits with effect from the date of unlawful dismissal.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            Each party to meet its own costs.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      Dissatisfied with the arbitral award, the respondent appealed to the court<i> a quo</i> with partial success.  It took the following 4 grounds on appeal:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.     The Honourable arbitrator unprocedurally accepted evidence submitted by the claimants subsequent to the arbitration hearing in respect of the purported hearing in respect of the purported identity of the innominate (sic) 60 other claimants who had not been included by name in the original claim.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       The Honourable arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in finding that since the alleged 60 other employees had a substantial interest in the matter they did not need to be identified and to be made parties in     arbitration proceedings before him. The fact that the employees have any kind of interest in the matter did not dispense with the entitlement of the appellant to know who the said appellants were at the commencement and during the course of the proceedings. The production of the names of the employees subsequent to the hearing and without an opportunity for the appellant to challenge the accuracy of the names and the positions so stated for the employees violated the appellant’s right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.       The Honourable Arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in failing to find that the contracts of employment for the said employees, E           Mapondera &amp; 60 Others had terminated by operation of law and the appellant could only re-engage the employees in terms of new contracts of employment. The said former employees having refused to sign new contracts of employment, the appellant lawfully confirmed the termination of their contracts of employment by operation of law on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2010. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">4.       The Honourable arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in ordering the reinstatement of E Mapondera &amp; 60 other employees without affording the Appellant an opportunity to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement. The order of reinstatement without the alternative for the payment of damages is not consistent with the ordinary rules of the law of contract and the specific circumstances of the appellant”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">THE RELIEF SOUGHT</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      On the basis of the above grounds of appeal the appellant sought the following relief:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(i)         That the claimant’s claim be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(ii)          Alternatively that in the event that the Honourable court finds that the contracts of employment for the Respondents were not lawfully terminated, that the Appellant is hereby directed to pay the Respondents damages in lieu (sic) of reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(iii)         The Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      Upon consideration of the facts and the law the court <i>a quo</i> found that the arbitration proceedings were a nullity at law because the claimants had cited a non-existent person and that the 2<sup>nd</sup> to 60 employees were not a party to the arbitration proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      It also found that the arbitrator had no discretion to award reinstatement without an alternative of payment of damages for unlawful dismissal. It therefore ordered as follows: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“It is accordingly ordered that-</span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal be and is hereby allowed on grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5. </span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal falls on ground of appeal 3.</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Overly the appeal succeeds as the proceedings were a nullity due to wrong identity of the employer.</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Each party to bear its costs.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]      Aggrieved by the above order the appellants appealed to this Court challenging the court <i>a quo’s </i>order on the following grounds:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“GROUNDS OF APPEAL</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo</i> erred at law in finding that the citation of the respondent through its trade name “Freda Rebecca Mine” was such an irregularity whose effect rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court erred at law in finding that 2<sup>nd</sup> to 61<sup>st</sup> appellants were not properly cited before the Arbitrator and that the extent of the impropriety was such that they were all not party to the arbitration proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="3"><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo</i> erred at law in finding that the Arbitrator has no power to order an employer to reinstate an unlawfully dismissed employee without giving the same employer the option to pay          damages <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement to the employee. “</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[17]      On the basis of the above grounds of appeal, the appellants prayed for the following relief:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.            That the appeal succeeds with costs </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            That the judgment of the court <i>a quo</i> is partially overturned and the order substituted with the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:123px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-35.45pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(a)      The preliminary point raised by the Appellant relating to its miscitation be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(b)     The preliminary point raised by the Appellant relating to the proper citation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 61<sup>st</sup> Respondents be and is hereby dismissed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> to 61<sup>st</sup> Respondents are hereby held to be properly before the court.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(c)     The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs and the arbitration award be and is hereby upheld.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      The grounds of appeal raise the following three cardinal issues for determination: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.       Whether or not the alleged improper citation of the respondent rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       Whether or not the appellants were properly before the Arbitral Tribunal.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.       Whether or not it was proper for the Arbitral Tribunal to order reinstatement of the appellants without an alternative of payment of damages <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[19]      It is pertinent to note at this juncture that the judgment appealed against in this case is to a large extent grounded on legal technicalities. A lot of industry has been expended by learned counsel in placing reliance on procedural legal technicalities that are best suited for courts of law rather than arbitral tribunals. It is trite that the object of arbitral tribunals is to do simple justice for the common person without being shackled by legal technicalities and formalities pertaining to an ordinary court of law. To this end in arbitration the rules of procedure are often relaxed and the arbitrator has a wide discretion provided that justice can be attained without doing violence to the basic tenets of natural justice. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[20]      Likewise, s 90A of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] is meant to unshackle the court <i>a quo</i> from the vice grip of rigid legal rules, formality and technicalities. It provides as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<b>90A Procedure and evidence in the Labour Court</b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The Labour Court shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence, and the court may ascertain any relevant fact by any means which the presiding officer thinks fit and which is not unfair or unjust to either party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:86px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Evidence may be adduced orally or in writing in any proceedings in the Labour Court, at the discretion of the presiding officer.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(3) The parties or their representatives to any proceedings in the Labour Court shall be entitled to question or cross-examine each other or any witness.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:86px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(4)     It shall be the responsibilities of the presiding officer to ascertain the facts in any proceedings in the Labour Court, and for that purpose he or she may—</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:111px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">call any party or his or her representative;</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:151px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(<i>b</i>) question or cross-examine any party or his or her representative or witness; and</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:151px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(<i>c</i>) put any question to a party or his or her representative or witness which is suggested to him or her by any party.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[21]      It is self-evident that s 90A of the Act distinguishes ordinary courts of law from the Labour Court as a special court. The law maker therefore saw it fit to confer the court <i>a quo</i> with a wider discretion than that obtaining in the ordinary courts of law in order to do simple industrial justice.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[22]      Because of their legal training and the involvement of lawyers, Labour Court judges often stray into the morass of legal jargon and technicalities much to the bewilderment of the unsophisticated litigants. This unwelcome tendency has the undesirable effect of mystifying industrial legal proceedings thereby clouding the dispensation of industrial justice. It therefore acts as a barrier to accessing industrial justice. This prompted McNALLY JA in <i>Dalny Mine v Banda<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> to remark that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“As a general rule, it seems to me undesirable that labour relations matters should be decided on the basis of procedural irregularities. By this I do not mean that such irregularities should be ignored. I mean that    such irregularities should be put right.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[23]      In <i>Edmore Taperesu Mazambani v International Trading Company (Private) Limited and Anor</i><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></a> MATHONSI JA had occasion to make similar remarks when he said:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“This is a court of justice which is required to resolve the real issues between the parties. It should not dabble too much into small technicalities.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[24]      It is therefore clear from the authorities that the primary function of the court <i>a quo</i> is to do simple justice between the parties without dwelling too much on legal technicalities. It is also self-evident that the general courts of law are beginning to mellow and drift towards the idea of correction of simple procedural errors in order to do real and substantial justice.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[25]      When interpreting statutes and codes of conduct, the court <i>a quo</i> should endeavour to give a broad liberal interpretation that is not embroiled in flimsy legal technicalities in order to achieve social justice based on equitable labour standards. On that score, I now proceed to determine whether or not the alleged improper citation of the respondent rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CITATION OF THE RESPONDENT RENDERED THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS A NULLITY</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:16px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[26]      Generally speaking, it is undisputable and a matter of trite elementary law that one cannot sue a non-existent person. In the leading case of <i>Gariya Safaris (Pvt) Ltd v van Wyk<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i>the<i> </i>High Court had occasion to remark that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“A summons has legal force and effect when it is issued by the plaintiff against an existing legal or natural person. If there is no legal or natural person answering to the names written in the summons as being those of the defendant, the summons is null and void <i>ab initio.”</i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[27]      That proposition of law was cited with approval by this Court in <i>Fadzai John v Delta Beverages<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> and a host of other cases cited by the respondent from both local and foreign jurisdictions. It is thus settled law and a matter of common sense that one cannot sue a non-existent person. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[28]      The main distinguishing feature in this case is that arbitral proceedings are different from trial proceedings in courts of law. Sight should therefore not be lost that trial proceedings in a court of law are commenced by summons drafted by the plaintiff. On the other hand arbitral proceedings are commenced by a reference drafted by the conciliator in terms of the Act. The claimant has no control over the drafting of the reference to arbitration whereas the plaintiff has full control over the drafting of the summons. It would therefore seem unfair and unjust to penalise the claimant for the sins of the conciliator in crafting the reference. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[29]      Counsel for the appellants further argued that where there is a person who actually exists who is sued in their colloquial, nickname or some other informal name, an amendment is permissible to formalise or regularise the citation. For that proposition of law he placed reliance on the South African case of <i>Four Tower Investments (Pty) Ltd v Andre’s Motors<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> among others. In that case, shortly before the hearing of the appeal it was discovered that in the summons and particulars of claim the plaintiff had been incorrectly cited and referred to as a company called <i>Four Tower Investments (Pty) Ltd</i> whereas it had been at all times a close corporation called <i>Four Tower Properties CC</i>. In the lease agreement which was the subject of the dispute between the parties it was also referred to as a company. The letting agent was responsible for the misdescription. Following an application for an amendment to regularize the citation the court held that under the circumstances an amendment was permissible.  The headnote reads:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“an application for an amendment would always be allowed  unless it was made <i>mala fide</i> or would cause prejudice to the other party which could not be compensated for by an award of costs or  by some other suitable order such as a postponement. (At 43H). </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, further that there had been a gradual move from an overly formal approach and in line with this approach courts should be careful not to find prejudice where none really exists. (At 44I-J)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i>         </i></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> further, that the fact on its own that the citation or description of a party happened to be of a non-existent entity should not render the summons a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">further, that in the present case the citation of the plaintiff had been nothing more than a misdescription and the application for amendment had to be allowed. (At47F)”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[30]      It is needless to say that the <i>Four Tower </i>case<i> supra</i> is on all fours with the instant case. The judgment is grounded on sound logic and meets the ends of justice between litigants.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[31]      Back home, in <i>Muzenda v Emirates Airlines &amp; Others<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="" id="_ftnref7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i>the Emirates Airlines had been misdescribed as Arab Airlines. In allowing the amendment to regularize the name, MATANDA MOYO J had this to say:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“I am of the view that the description of a party to a suit does not immutably determine the nature and identity of a party. The law reports are full with instances where the correct description of a party was allowed, in the absence of prejudice to the other party involved. This would be done after an application to amend. The plaintiff herein was not diligent. After being advised of the wrong citation of first defendant, all she had to do was apply for amendment. I would have granted such amendment as I am of the view that there was no prejudice to first defendant. However the court can only do so upon asking. The court cannot <i>mero motu </i>grant orders not sought. Without such amendment, the first defendant remains wrongly cited. See <i>ZFC Ltd</i> v <i>Taylor</i> 1999 (1) ZLR 308 and Order 20 r 132 and 134 of this court’s rules, <i>Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited</i> v <i>Waymark NO</i> 1995 (2) See <i>ZFC Ltd</i> v <i>Taylor</i> 1999 (1) ZLR 308 and Order 20 r 132 and 134 of this court’s rules, <i>Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited</i> v <i>Waymark NO</i> 1995 (2) SA”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="Default"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">[32]      The learned judge beautifully articulates the law in circumstances that are on all fours with the case at hand. In the same vein, in <i>Masuku </i>v <i>Delt Beverages<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title="" id="_ftnref8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">[8]</span></span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i> the same court held that: </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“… generally, proceedings against a non-existent entity are void <i>ab initio</i> and thus a nullity. However, where there is an entity which through some error or omission is not cited accurately, but where the entity is pointed out with sufficient accuracy, the summons would not be defective.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[33]      I could go on and on but the principle of law established by case law is clear. Where an existing entity is inadvertently misdescribed in judicial proceedings it is permissible to apply for correction of the anomaly in good faith provided that there is no irreparable prejudice to the other party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[34]      It is common cause that taking a cue from laid down precedent the appellants successfully applied to the court <i>a quo</i> before the same judge for an amendment of the citation of the respondent’s name. He granted the order on 31 May 2018 under order number LC/MD/ORD/78/2018. It reads:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“it is ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:144px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-51.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘1.             the application to amend the citation of the respondent be and is hereby granted.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                     2.         each party is to bear its own costs.’”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[35]      It is amazing that when the matter came up for hearing on the merits the same judge held that the proceedings before the arbitrator were a nullity because the appellants had sued a non-existent person. This was clearly a serious misdirection considering that the honourable judge was bound by his earlier order that had regularised the incorrect citation of the respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[36]      It will be remembered that the arbitrator’s terms of reference were, “To determine whether the dismissal of E Mapondera and 60 others was lawful or not.” It is trite that an arbitrator is bound by the given terms of reference. He has no jurisdiction outside the terms of reference. Respondent’s objection sought to amend the terms of reference by limiting the terms of arbitration to E Mapondera to the exclusion of the 60 other employees. This the arbitrator could not do as it would amount to a violation of his terms of reference. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[37]      Placing reliance on the High Court cases of <i>Panganai and 20 Others v Kadir and Sons (Private) Limited<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title="" id="_ftnref9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> and<i> Prosser and 35 Others v Ziscosteel Company Limited<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title="" id="_ftnref10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a>, </i>the learned judge <i>a quo</i> held that apart from E Mapondera the other 60 employees were not properly before the arbitrator. He reasoned that this was because the arbitrator had not been provided with a list of their names and they had not filed affidavits professing jointer to the arbitral proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[38]      It is rather ironic if not irrational that the respondent sought validation of dismissals that were carried out in the name of a non-existent person styled Freda Rebecca Gold Mine which it disowns. It was therefore a serious misdirection that after holding that the proceedings before the arbitrator were a nullity, the learned judge proceeded to determine the appeal on the merits. This was despite his ruling that there was no respondent before him. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[39]      What escaped the learned judge <i>a quo’s</i> attention is that the two precedents he relied upon in para 33 above were determined by the High Court in terms of the High Court Rules which are not strictly applicable to arbitration proceedings in terms of the Act. Again the learned judge failed to distinguish arbitral proceedings from trial proceedings in a court of law. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[40]      Conscious of his obligation to determine the complaint of the 60 other employees by reference, the arbitrator properly sought and obtained clarification on the identities of these other employees. That clarification was communicated to the respondent thereby giving it an opportunity to be heard on the authenticity of the list of names provided. There was therefore no prejudice to the respondent, real or imagined. In my view the arbitrator did not  misdirect  himself in any way as that was the  correct  thing to do to facilitate the proper discharge of his mandate in terms of the reference. Thus, again, the learned judge <i>a quo</i> misdirected himself and fell into error by holding that the other 60 appellants were not properly before the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[41]      Having come to the conclusion that the 60 other employees were not properly before the arbitrator, it was remiss of the learned judge <i>a quo </i>to proceed to deal with the merits of the appeal before him. He again erred in this respect. The proceedings beyond that finding were therefore a legal nullity. They cannot stand in light of the gross misdirection by the learned judge <i>a quo.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO ORDER REINSTATEMENT OF THE APPELLANTS WITHOUT AN ALTERNATIVE OF PAYMENT OF DAMAGES IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[42]      In view of the finding that the proceedings pertaining to the merits of the case were a legal nullity, it shall not be necessary to determine the above issue.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DISPOSAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[43]      For the foregoing findings of fact and law, I hold that both the appellants and the respondents were properly cited and lawfully appeared before the arbitrator. The court <i>a quo</i> fell into error and misdirected itself by nullifying the proceedings before the arbitrator without any legal basis. The court <i>a quo</i> therefore ought to have dismissed both objections <i>in limine</i> and proceeded to hear and determine the appeal on the merits. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[44]      In the result it shall be necessary to reverse the court <i>a quo’s</i> judgment and order a rehearing of the appeal before a different judge as the judge <i>a quo’s </i>views appear to have been clouded by his earlier faulty findings of fact and law.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[45]      Costs follow the result in respect of the appeal whereas costs of the objection <i>in limine</i> shall be in the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[46]      It is accordingly ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.            The appeal be and is hereby allowed with costs being costs in the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            The judgment of the court <i>a quo</i> be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(a)    The preliminary points raised by the appellant relating to its miscitation be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-21.25pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(b)   The preliminary point raised by the appellant relating to the proper citation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 60<sup>th</sup> respondents be and is hereby dismissed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> to 60<sup>th</sup> Respondents are hereby held to be properly before the court.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-21.25pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.         The court <i>a quo’s</i> determination on the merits of the appeal before it be and is hereby quashed and set aside </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">4.         The matter be and is hereby remitted to the court <i>a quo</i> for a hearing <i>de novo</i> of the appeal before a different judge.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAVANGIRA JA</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                     I agree</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                   I agree</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Dube, Manikai &amp; Hwacha, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">appellant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Page 165 of the record</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 1999 (1_ ZLR 220 (S)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></a> SC 88/20</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 1996 (2) ZLR 246 (H)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></span></a> SC 40/17</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 2005 (3) SA 39 (N)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn7"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title="" id="_ftn7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[7]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH 775/15</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn8"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title="" id="_ftn8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[8]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 2012 (2) Z LR 112 (H)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn9"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title="" id="_ftn9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[9]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH – 26 - 95</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn10"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title="" id="_ftn10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[10]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH – 201 - 93</span></span></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-3b6f2a1f58ceb046d7fa0250fdaa98c4d7ef7140b158429e47b9a9ffc97dc15c"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Judgment No. SC 81/22</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Case No. SC 565/19</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Ref Case No. LC/H/82/11</span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">REPORTABLE</span></span></span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">        (67)</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">EDMORE     MAPONDERA     AND     55     OTHERS</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">FREDA     REBECCA     GOLD     MINE     HOLDINGS     LIMITED</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAVANGIRA JA, BHUNU JA &amp; CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE: 3 JULY 2021 AND 14 JULY 2022</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A. K. Maguchu, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for the appellants</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T. Mpofu, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for the respondent</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">BHUNU JA:</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">INTRODUCTION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]        This is a partial appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court, (the court <i>a quo)</i> LC/H/2/19 dated 7 February 2019. The appeal is against the court <i>a quo’s</i> ruling on the question of citation of the parties and the arbitrator’s failure to award damages as an alternative to reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        The appeal was initially set-down for hearing on 11 September 2020 whereupon it was removed from the roll by consent of the parties to consider placing it before a full bench comprising a panel of 5 judges in terms of s 3 of the Supreme Court Act [<i>Chapter 7:13</i>].</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        Upon due consideration of the nature and complexity of the appeal, the learned presiding judge  determined that there was no need to set up a full bench comprising 5 judges to deliberate over the appeal as it was eminently capable of resolution by a three panel bench as previously constituted. The appeal was then set down for hearing before the same panel of judges on 16 June 2021.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CASE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]        The 56 appellants were employed by the respondent Freda Rebecca Mine Holdings Limited in various capacities at its mine in Bindura. Owing to virulent economic hardships at the time, the respondent ceased its mining operations sometime in 2008 without terminating the appellants’ respective contracts of employment.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        Sometime in 2009 the respondent sought to resuscitate its mining operations. In doing so it unilaterally sought to reengage the appellants on inferior contracts different from those obtaining as at the time it ceased operations in 2008. A dispute then arose concerning the appropriate terms of employment upon resumption of mining operations  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        Following failure to resolve the dispute the respondent arbitrarily wrote to the appellants terminating their original contracts of employment. The termination letters were written on a standard letterhead bearing the name <b>FREDA REBECCA GOLD MINE. </b>The letters were signed by one T Chivonivoni who designated himself/herself as the <b>GENERAL MANAGER- FREDA REBECCA GOLD MINE. </b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        Dissatisfied by the turn of events, the appellants took the dispute to the designated agent. The designated agent referred the dispute to conciliation. Upon failure of the conciliation process the conciliator issued a certificate of no settlement and completed a Reference to Arbitration on a standard form in which he designated the parties as, <b><i>“Freda Rebecca Mine alleged unfair labour practice of E Mapondera and 60 others</i></b><i>”</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a>. The reference form is dated 12 May 2010. It is common cause that the proper citation of the respondent as a party to legal proceedings ought to have been <b>Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Holdings Limited.   </b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">TERMS OF REFERENCE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The arbitrator’s terms of reference were, “To determine whether the dismissal of E. Mapondera and 60 others was lawful or not.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        At the hearing before the arbitrator the respondent took the preliminary objection that apart from Edmond Mapondera the rest of the remaining appellants had no <i>locus standi</i> because their names had not been listed as claimants and E Mapondera was not authorised to represent them.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      Counsel for the appellants argued that the respondent had always been aware that the case involved 61 employees whose identities had not been placed in issue at conciliation stage. It was only at the arbitration stage that the respondent belatedly sought to make it an issue. During the course of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator was then provided with a list of the concerned employees comprising a total of 58 claimants. The list of the claimants who were party to the proceedings was availed to the respondent</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The arbitrator dismissed the objection <i>in limine</i> on the ground that the appellants had a real and substantial interest in the matter and that right from the initiation of the legal proceedings the respondent knew the identity of its adversaries. Having dismissed the preliminary objection, the arbitrator proceeded to make an award in favour of E Mapondera and 57 others on 12 January 2011.  The award was couched in the following terms:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.          That the claimants are hereby reinstated to their positions without loss of salary and benefits with effect from the date of unlawful dismissal.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            Each party to meet its own costs.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      Dissatisfied with the arbitral award, the respondent appealed to the court<i> a quo</i> with partial success.  It took the following 4 grounds on appeal:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.     The Honourable arbitrator unprocedurally accepted evidence submitted by the claimants subsequent to the arbitration hearing in respect of the purported hearing in respect of the purported identity of the innominate (sic) 60 other claimants who had not been included by name in the original claim.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       The Honourable arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in finding that since the alleged 60 other employees had a substantial interest in the matter they did not need to be identified and to be made parties in     arbitration proceedings before him. The fact that the employees have any kind of interest in the matter did not dispense with the entitlement of the appellant to know who the said appellants were at the commencement and during the course of the proceedings. The production of the names of the employees subsequent to the hearing and without an opportunity for the appellant to challenge the accuracy of the names and the positions so stated for the employees violated the appellant’s right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.       The Honourable Arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in failing to find that the contracts of employment for the said employees, E           Mapondera &amp; 60 Others had terminated by operation of law and the appellant could only re-engage the employees in terms of new contracts of employment. The said former employees having refused to sign new contracts of employment, the appellant lawfully confirmed the termination of their contracts of employment by operation of law on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2010. </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">4.       The Honourable arbitrator fundamentally misdirected himself in ordering the reinstatement of E Mapondera &amp; 60 other employees without affording the Appellant an opportunity to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement. The order of reinstatement without the alternative for the payment of damages is not consistent with the ordinary rules of the law of contract and the specific circumstances of the appellant”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">THE RELIEF SOUGHT</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      On the basis of the above grounds of appeal the appellant sought the following relief:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(i)         That the claimant’s claim be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(ii)          Alternatively that in the event that the Honourable court finds that the contracts of employment for the Respondents were not lawfully terminated, that the Appellant is hereby directed to pay the Respondents damages in lieu (sic) of reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(iii)         The Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      Upon consideration of the facts and the law the court <i>a quo</i> found that the arbitration proceedings were a nullity at law because the claimants had cited a non-existent person and that the 2<sup>nd</sup> to 60 employees were not a party to the arbitration proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      It also found that the arbitrator had no discretion to award reinstatement without an alternative of payment of damages for unlawful dismissal. It therefore ordered as follows: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“It is accordingly ordered that-</span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal be and is hereby allowed on grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5. </span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal falls on ground of appeal 3.</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Overly the appeal succeeds as the proceedings were a nullity due to wrong identity of the employer.</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Each party to bear its costs.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]      Aggrieved by the above order the appellants appealed to this Court challenging the court <i>a quo’s </i>order on the following grounds:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“GROUNDS OF APPEAL</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo</i> erred at law in finding that the citation of the respondent through its trade name “Freda Rebecca Mine” was such an irregularity whose effect rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court erred at law in finding that 2<sup>nd</sup> to 61<sup>st</sup> appellants were not properly cited before the Arbitrator and that the extent of the impropriety was such that they were all not party to the arbitration proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="3"><li style="margin-left:22px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo</i> erred at law in finding that the Arbitrator has no power to order an employer to reinstate an unlawfully dismissed employee without giving the same employer the option to pay          damages <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement to the employee. “</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[17]      On the basis of the above grounds of appeal, the appellants prayed for the following relief:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.            That the appeal succeeds with costs </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            That the judgment of the court <i>a quo</i> is partially overturned and the order substituted with the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:123px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-35.45pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(a)      The preliminary point raised by the Appellant relating to its miscitation be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(b)     The preliminary point raised by the Appellant relating to the proper citation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 61<sup>st</sup> Respondents be and is hereby dismissed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> to 61<sup>st</sup> Respondents are hereby held to be properly before the court.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(c)     The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs and the arbitration award be and is hereby upheld.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      The grounds of appeal raise the following three cardinal issues for determination: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.       Whether or not the alleged improper citation of the respondent rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       Whether or not the appellants were properly before the Arbitral Tribunal.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.       Whether or not it was proper for the Arbitral Tribunal to order reinstatement of the appellants without an alternative of payment of damages <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[19]      It is pertinent to note at this juncture that the judgment appealed against in this case is to a large extent grounded on legal technicalities. A lot of industry has been expended by learned counsel in placing reliance on procedural legal technicalities that are best suited for courts of law rather than arbitral tribunals. It is trite that the object of arbitral tribunals is to do simple justice for the common person without being shackled by legal technicalities and formalities pertaining to an ordinary court of law. To this end in arbitration the rules of procedure are often relaxed and the arbitrator has a wide discretion provided that justice can be attained without doing violence to the basic tenets of natural justice. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[20]      Likewise, s 90A of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] is meant to unshackle the court <i>a quo</i> from the vice grip of rigid legal rules, formality and technicalities. It provides as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<b>90A Procedure and evidence in the Labour Court</b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The Labour Court shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence, and the court may ascertain any relevant fact by any means which the presiding officer thinks fit and which is not unfair or unjust to either party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:86px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Evidence may be adduced orally or in writing in any proceedings in the Labour Court, at the discretion of the presiding officer.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(3) The parties or their representatives to any proceedings in the Labour Court shall be entitled to question or cross-examine each other or any witness.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:86px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(4)     It shall be the responsibilities of the presiding officer to ascertain the facts in any proceedings in the Labour Court, and for that purpose he or she may—</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:111px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">call any party or his or her representative;</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:151px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(<i>b</i>) question or cross-examine any party or his or her representative or witness; and</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:151px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(<i>c</i>) put any question to a party or his or her representative or witness which is suggested to him or her by any party.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[21]      It is self-evident that s 90A of the Act distinguishes ordinary courts of law from the Labour Court as a special court. The law maker therefore saw it fit to confer the court <i>a quo</i> with a wider discretion than that obtaining in the ordinary courts of law in order to do simple industrial justice.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[22]      Because of their legal training and the involvement of lawyers, Labour Court judges often stray into the morass of legal jargon and technicalities much to the bewilderment of the unsophisticated litigants. This unwelcome tendency has the undesirable effect of mystifying industrial legal proceedings thereby clouding the dispensation of industrial justice. It therefore acts as a barrier to accessing industrial justice. This prompted McNALLY JA in <i>Dalny Mine v Banda<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> to remark that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“As a general rule, it seems to me undesirable that labour relations matters should be decided on the basis of procedural irregularities. By this I do not mean that such irregularities should be ignored. I mean that    such irregularities should be put right.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[23]      In <i>Edmore Taperesu Mazambani v International Trading Company (Private) Limited and Anor</i><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></a> MATHONSI JA had occasion to make similar remarks when he said:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“This is a court of justice which is required to resolve the real issues between the parties. It should not dabble too much into small technicalities.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[24]      It is therefore clear from the authorities that the primary function of the court <i>a quo</i> is to do simple justice between the parties without dwelling too much on legal technicalities. It is also self-evident that the general courts of law are beginning to mellow and drift towards the idea of correction of simple procedural errors in order to do real and substantial justice.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[25]      When interpreting statutes and codes of conduct, the court <i>a quo</i> should endeavour to give a broad liberal interpretation that is not embroiled in flimsy legal technicalities in order to achieve social justice based on equitable labour standards. On that score, I now proceed to determine whether or not the alleged improper citation of the respondent rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CITATION OF THE RESPONDENT RENDERED THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS A NULLITY</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-top:16px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[26]      Generally speaking, it is undisputable and a matter of trite elementary law that one cannot sue a non-existent person. In the leading case of <i>Gariya Safaris (Pvt) Ltd v van Wyk<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i>the<i> </i>High Court had occasion to remark that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“A summons has legal force and effect when it is issued by the plaintiff against an existing legal or natural person. If there is no legal or natural person answering to the names written in the summons as being those of the defendant, the summons is null and void <i>ab initio.”</i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[27]      That proposition of law was cited with approval by this Court in <i>Fadzai John v Delta Beverages<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> and a host of other cases cited by the respondent from both local and foreign jurisdictions. It is thus settled law and a matter of common sense that one cannot sue a non-existent person. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[28]      The main distinguishing feature in this case is that arbitral proceedings are different from trial proceedings in courts of law. Sight should therefore not be lost that trial proceedings in a court of law are commenced by summons drafted by the plaintiff. On the other hand arbitral proceedings are commenced by a reference drafted by the conciliator in terms of the Act. The claimant has no control over the drafting of the reference to arbitration whereas the plaintiff has full control over the drafting of the summons. It would therefore seem unfair and unjust to penalise the claimant for the sins of the conciliator in crafting the reference. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[29]      Counsel for the appellants further argued that where there is a person who actually exists who is sued in their colloquial, nickname or some other informal name, an amendment is permissible to formalise or regularise the citation. For that proposition of law he placed reliance on the South African case of <i>Four Tower Investments (Pty) Ltd v Andre’s Motors<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> among others. In that case, shortly before the hearing of the appeal it was discovered that in the summons and particulars of claim the plaintiff had been incorrectly cited and referred to as a company called <i>Four Tower Investments (Pty) Ltd</i> whereas it had been at all times a close corporation called <i>Four Tower Properties CC</i>. In the lease agreement which was the subject of the dispute between the parties it was also referred to as a company. The letting agent was responsible for the misdescription. Following an application for an amendment to regularize the citation the court held that under the circumstances an amendment was permissible.  The headnote reads:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“an application for an amendment would always be allowed  unless it was made <i>mala fide</i> or would cause prejudice to the other party which could not be compensated for by an award of costs or  by some other suitable order such as a postponement. (At 43H). </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, further that there had been a gradual move from an overly formal approach and in line with this approach courts should be careful not to find prejudice where none really exists. (At 44I-J)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i>         </i></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> further, that the fact on its own that the citation or description of a party happened to be of a non-existent entity should not render the summons a nullity.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Held </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">further, that in the present case the citation of the plaintiff had been nothing more than a misdescription and the application for amendment had to be allowed. (At47F)”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[30]      It is needless to say that the <i>Four Tower </i>case<i> supra</i> is on all fours with the instant case. The judgment is grounded on sound logic and meets the ends of justice between litigants.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[31]      Back home, in <i>Muzenda v Emirates Airlines &amp; Others<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="" id="_ftnref7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i>the Emirates Airlines had been misdescribed as Arab Airlines. In allowing the amendment to regularize the name, MATANDA MOYO J had this to say:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“I am of the view that the description of a party to a suit does not immutably determine the nature and identity of a party. The law reports are full with instances where the correct description of a party was allowed, in the absence of prejudice to the other party involved. This would be done after an application to amend. The plaintiff herein was not diligent. After being advised of the wrong citation of first defendant, all she had to do was apply for amendment. I would have granted such amendment as I am of the view that there was no prejudice to first defendant. However the court can only do so upon asking. The court cannot <i>mero motu </i>grant orders not sought. Without such amendment, the first defendant remains wrongly cited. See <i>ZFC Ltd</i> v <i>Taylor</i> 1999 (1) ZLR 308 and Order 20 r 132 and 134 of this court’s rules, <i>Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited</i> v <i>Waymark NO</i> 1995 (2) See <i>ZFC Ltd</i> v <i>Taylor</i> 1999 (1) ZLR 308 and Order 20 r 132 and 134 of this court’s rules, <i>Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited</i> v <i>Waymark NO</i> 1995 (2) SA”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="Default"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">[32]      The learned judge beautifully articulates the law in circumstances that are on all fours with the case at hand. In the same vein, in <i>Masuku </i>v <i>Delt Beverages<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title="" id="_ftnref8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">[8]</span></span></span></span></b></span></span></a> </i> the same court held that: </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“… generally, proceedings against a non-existent entity are void <i>ab initio</i> and thus a nullity. However, where there is an entity which through some error or omission is not cited accurately, but where the entity is pointed out with sufficient accuracy, the summons would not be defective.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[33]      I could go on and on but the principle of law established by case law is clear. Where an existing entity is inadvertently misdescribed in judicial proceedings it is permissible to apply for correction of the anomaly in good faith provided that there is no irreparable prejudice to the other party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[34]      It is common cause that taking a cue from laid down precedent the appellants successfully applied to the court <i>a quo</i> before the same judge for an amendment of the citation of the respondent’s name. He granted the order on 31 May 2018 under order number LC/MD/ORD/78/2018. It reads:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“it is ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:144px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-51.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘1.             the application to amend the citation of the respondent be and is hereby granted.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                     2.         each party is to bear its own costs.’”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[35]      It is amazing that when the matter came up for hearing on the merits the same judge held that the proceedings before the arbitrator were a nullity because the appellants had sued a non-existent person. This was clearly a serious misdirection considering that the honourable judge was bound by his earlier order that had regularised the incorrect citation of the respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[36]      It will be remembered that the arbitrator’s terms of reference were, “To determine whether the dismissal of E Mapondera and 60 others was lawful or not.” It is trite that an arbitrator is bound by the given terms of reference. He has no jurisdiction outside the terms of reference. Respondent’s objection sought to amend the terms of reference by limiting the terms of arbitration to E Mapondera to the exclusion of the 60 other employees. This the arbitrator could not do as it would amount to a violation of his terms of reference. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[37]      Placing reliance on the High Court cases of <i>Panganai and 20 Others v Kadir and Sons (Private) Limited<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title="" id="_ftnref9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a></i> and<i> Prosser and 35 Others v Ziscosteel Company Limited<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title="" id="_ftnref10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]</span></span></span></b></span></span></a>, </i>the learned judge <i>a quo</i> held that apart from E Mapondera the other 60 employees were not properly before the arbitrator. He reasoned that this was because the arbitrator had not been provided with a list of their names and they had not filed affidavits professing jointer to the arbitral proceedings.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[38]      It is rather ironic if not irrational that the respondent sought validation of dismissals that were carried out in the name of a non-existent person styled Freda Rebecca Gold Mine which it disowns. It was therefore a serious misdirection that after holding that the proceedings before the arbitrator were a nullity, the learned judge proceeded to determine the appeal on the merits. This was despite his ruling that there was no respondent before him. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[39]      What escaped the learned judge <i>a quo’s</i> attention is that the two precedents he relied upon in para 33 above were determined by the High Court in terms of the High Court Rules which are not strictly applicable to arbitration proceedings in terms of the Act. Again the learned judge failed to distinguish arbitral proceedings from trial proceedings in a court of law. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[40]      Conscious of his obligation to determine the complaint of the 60 other employees by reference, the arbitrator properly sought and obtained clarification on the identities of these other employees. That clarification was communicated to the respondent thereby giving it an opportunity to be heard on the authenticity of the list of names provided. There was therefore no prejudice to the respondent, real or imagined. In my view the arbitrator did not  misdirect  himself in any way as that was the  correct  thing to do to facilitate the proper discharge of his mandate in terms of the reference. Thus, again, the learned judge <i>a quo</i> misdirected himself and fell into error by holding that the other 60 appellants were not properly before the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[41]      Having come to the conclusion that the 60 other employees were not properly before the arbitrator, it was remiss of the learned judge <i>a quo </i>to proceed to deal with the merits of the appeal before him. He again erred in this respect. The proceedings beyond that finding were therefore a legal nullity. They cannot stand in light of the gross misdirection by the learned judge <i>a quo.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO ORDER REINSTATEMENT OF THE APPELLANTS WITHOUT AN ALTERNATIVE OF PAYMENT OF DAMAGES IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[42]      In view of the finding that the proceedings pertaining to the merits of the case were a legal nullity, it shall not be necessary to determine the above issue.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DISPOSAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[43]      For the foregoing findings of fact and law, I hold that both the appellants and the respondents were properly cited and lawfully appeared before the arbitrator. The court <i>a quo</i> fell into error and misdirected itself by nullifying the proceedings before the arbitrator without any legal basis. The court <i>a quo</i> therefore ought to have dismissed both objections <i>in limine</i> and proceeded to hear and determine the appeal on the merits. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[44]      In the result it shall be necessary to reverse the court <i>a quo’s</i> judgment and order a rehearing of the appeal before a different judge as the judge <i>a quo’s </i>views appear to have been clouded by his earlier faulty findings of fact and law.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[45]      Costs follow the result in respect of the appeal whereas costs of the objection <i>in limine</i> shall be in the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[46]      It is accordingly ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1.            The appeal be and is hereby allowed with costs being costs in the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-43.5pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.            The judgment of the court <i>a quo</i> be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(a)    The preliminary points raised by the appellant relating to its miscitation be and is hereby dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-21.25pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(b)   The preliminary point raised by the appellant relating to the proper citation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 60<sup>th</sup> respondents be and is hereby dismissed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> to 60<sup>th</sup> Respondents are hereby held to be properly before the court.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:113px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-21.25pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">3.         The court <i>a quo’s</i> determination on the merits of the appeal before it be and is hereby quashed and set aside </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">4.         The matter be and is hereby remitted to the court <i>a quo</i> for a hearing <i>de novo</i> of the appeal before a different judge.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAVANGIRA JA</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                     I agree</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                   I agree</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Dube, Manikai &amp; Hwacha, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">appellant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Page 165 of the record</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 1999 (1_ ZLR 220 (S)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></a> SC 88/20</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 1996 (2) ZLR 246 (H)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></span></a> SC 40/17</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 2005 (3) SA 39 (N)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn7"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title="" id="_ftn7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[7]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH 775/15</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn8"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title="" id="_ftn8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[8]</span></span></span></span></span></a> 2012 (2) Z LR 112 (H)</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn9"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title="" id="_ftn9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[9]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH – 26 - 95</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn10"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title="" id="_ftn10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[10]</span></span></span></span></span></a> HH – 201 - 93</span></span></p> </div> </div></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 25 Jul 2022 07:48:45 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 12536 at http://www.zimlii.org Dube v PSMAS and Another (5 of 2022) [2022] ZWSC 5 (24 January 2022); http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2022/5 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Dube v PSMAS and Another (5 of 2022) [2022] ZWSC 5 (24 January 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2236" hreflang="x-default">Appeal (EMPLOYMENT)</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1454" hreflang="en">Arbitration awards</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1457" hreflang="en">Set Aside Arbitration Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2300" hreflang="x-default">Contract (EMPLOYMENT)</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1750" hreflang="en">Termination of Contract</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2394" hreflang="x-default">Director</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1982" hreflang="en">Unlawful Or Unfair Dismissal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1983" hreflang="en">Wages, pensions and benefits</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 01/31/2022 - 16:37</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2022/5/2022-zwsc-5.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=54756">2022-zwsc-5.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2022/5/2022-zwsc-5.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=581711">2022-zwsc-5.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB">Judgment No. SC 5/22 </span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB">Civil Appeal No. SC 82/20</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DISTRIBUTABLE</span></span></span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">:            (5)</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CUTHBERT      ELKANA     DUBE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">    PREMIER     SERVICE     MEDICAL      AID      SOCIETY     (2)     PREMIER      SERVICE      MEDICAL      INVESTMENTS</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAKONI JA, MATHONSI JA &amp; CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE: 15 OCTOBER 2021 &amp; 24 JANUARY 2022</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">L. Madhuku</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the appellant</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">F. Mahere</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the first and second respondents</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAKONI  JA:            </span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Labour Court  (the court <i>a quo</i>) which allowed two appeals filed in that court by the first and second respondents in terms of s 98 (10) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>].  It set aside the two awards made in favour of the appellant and in their place substituted them with an order dismissing the appellant`s claims before the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">FACTUAL BACKGROUND</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first respondent is a medical aid society registered in terms of the Medical Services Act, [<i>Chapter 15:13</i>]. The second respondent is the investment vehicle of the first respondent.  Both respondents are managed by two separate boards of directors. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            It is common cause that the appellant was the Chief Executive Officer of the first respondent in terms of a contract of employment. He also drew a salary from the second respondent in unclear circumstances. He attained the retirement age of (60 years) in December 2013 in terms of the Retirement Policy of the Society 4/2003 of the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 March 2013, both boards of directors of the respondents unanimously extended the appellant`s tenure of office by a further ten years. The new contract commenced from 1 January 2014 and would end on 31 December 2024. At the beginning of 2014, the appellant commenced the extended employment contract. The parties also reached an agreement that the appellant`s monthly salary would be US$60 000.00 per month effective January 2014 along with other benefits. It was later reduced to US$43 000.00. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Following allegations that the appellant was taking an exorbitant salary of US$92 000.00 every month before allowances without the knowledge of the full board, other than two of its members, the boards withdrew their earlier decision of extending the appellant`s contract of employment. They relied on the provisions of the Retirement Policy to rescind the extension of the employment contract. The appellant was thus requested to take a pre-retirement paid leave. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In response, the appellant, through a letter dated 20 February 2014 addressed to the first respondent, claimed that he had a subsisting contract of employment for a period of ten years which commenced on 1 January 2014. He insisted that the contract had not been terminated in any way and consequently he would abide by it and continue to execute his duties in terms of the same until its expiry. No such letter was written to the second respondent. Consequently, a dispute arose between the appellant and the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 17 February 2015, the dispute between the appellant and the first respondent was referred to compulsory arbitration. The terms of reference were as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“To determine whether or not the claimant`s (the appellant in this matter) contract of employment was lawfully terminated;</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appropriate remedy”</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 March 2015, a dispute in the matter between the appellant and the second respondent was referred to compulsory arbitration.  It is not clear from the record how the dispute had arisen. The terms of reference were as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Whether or not the appellant`s contract of employment was enforceable against the second respondent;</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, whether or not the claimant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.”</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 April 2015 the arbitrator issued awards in respect of both matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the matter between the appellant and the first respondent the arbitral award was to the effect that the contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted and thus remained in force.  He further ordered that the first respondent  pay the appellant all salaries and benefits from the date these were last paid at the salary scale of US$92 000.00 per month.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the matter between the appellant and the second respondent the arbitral award was to the effect that the appellant`s contract of employment was enforceable against the second respondent and that the contract was never terminated thereby rendering the appellant entitled to payment of salaries and benefits as claimed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:120px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Aggrieved, the first and second respondents independently appealed against the two arbitral awards to the Labour Court under LC/H/348/15 and LC/H/349/15 respectively. The two appeals were consolidated for the sake of convenience. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT <i>A QUO</i>          </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first respondent, in its heads of argument before the court <i>a quo, </i>in which it was the first appellant, argued that the arbitrator made a determination that ran foul of the issue presented before him. It submitted that the issue before the arbitrator was whether or not the employment contract between the first respondent and the appellant was lawfully terminated. Thus, it insisted that the arbitrator fell into error when he determined that there was a valid and enforceable contract between the parties whereas it was common cause between the parties that no contract still existed. The first respondent contended that the arbitrator was bound by the terms of reference and had no authority to reformat the issues as presented to him by the parties. It was also the first respondent`s case that no evidence was tendered to justify the amount of US$92 000.00 per month which was awarded to the appellant by the arbitrator. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The second respondent largely associated itself with the arguments made by the first respondent regarding the arbitrator straying from the terms of reference. In addition to that, the second respondent submitted that the arbitrator missed the import of the issues referred to him and came to the conclusion that there existed a contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent. The second respondent further submitted that it was simply the investment vehicle of the first respondent and used to contribute to the appellant`s salary at the request or on the instructions of the appellant. Thus it was the second respondent`s submission that these remittances did not make it the appellant`s employer.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Per Contra, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the appellant submitted that the arbitrator correctly determined the issues before him. He submitted that the issues referred to the arbitrator were whether or not the appellant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and to determine the appropriate remedy. He further submitted that determining whether or not the contract was valid was the first stage of inquiry which would then lead to the conclusion of whether or not the same was lawfully terminated. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Regarding the second respondent, he submitted that the evidence placed before the arbitrator of termination of the contract in the form of a letter was not sufficient enough to prove that the same was terminated in terms of the law. The appellant insisted that a contract of employment could only be terminated by mutual consent, death, dismissal through a formal disciplinary hearing or resignation. Thus he proffered that a valid contract still existed as the second respondent failed to prove termination. The appellant further submitted that the second respondent was his employer by extension as management of the same reported directly to him. It followed that his contract of employment with the second respondent was valid and enforceable.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DETERMINATION OF THE COURT <i>A QUO</i></span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The court <i>a quo </i>examined the terms of reference as placed before the arbitrator by the parties. With respect to the first respondent, the court reasoned that it was clear in the parties` minds that the contract of employment had been terminated and what required determination was whether or not such termination was lawful. The court further reasoned that the arbitrator fell outside the terms of reference by making a determination that the contract of employment still subsisted and remained in force. The court relied on the case of <i>C Kambuzuma and Ors v The Athol Evans Hospital Home Complex </i>SC 118/04 in its reasoning that the arbitrator ought to have confined himself to the terms of reference and not go further than that.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In addition, the court <i>a quo</i> held that the arbitrator, by making a finding that there was still a valid contract in existence between the parties, effectively made a new employment contract for the parties contrary to the Supreme Court decision in the matter between <i>Kundai Magodora &amp; Ors v Care International Zimbabwe </i>2014 (1) ZLR 397.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">With respect to the second respondent, the court <i>a quo </i>made a finding that, as was apparent from the record, the second respondent did not extend the appellants tenure. It effectively concluded that there was nothing to enforce between the appellant and the second respondent as there was never an employment contract between them. Consequently, the court found that there was nothing to terminate and therefore the appellant was not entitled to anything from the second respondent. In the result it allowed the appeals and set aside the arbitral awards.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This prompted the appellant to note the present appeal on the following grounds:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">GROUNDS OF APPEAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.     The court <i>a quo </i>misdirected itself and erred at law in finding that the decision of the arbitrator that there was still a subsisting contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent was outside the arbitrator`s terms of reference.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>erred by making a determination that there was no binding contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent.”</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-28.9pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In addressing the first ground of appeal Mr <i>Madhuku </i>for the appellant made the following submissions; the issue before the court was a question of interpretation of the terms of reference. The terms of reference were quite straightforward and had inherent in them two questions namely:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> Has the contract of employment been terminated?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> If so was the termination lawful?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A term of reference in terms of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter (28; 01</i>)] (the Act) is statutorily regulated and must be interpreted in terms of the scheme under Part XII of the Act. What has to be resolved is the dispute that was referred to conciliation. The court <i>a quo</i> fell into error by treating this as voluntary arbitration in which the terms of reference were as a result of the meeting of the minds of the parties.  To the contrary this was a compulsory arbitration in terms of the Act where the labour officer formulates the terms of reference after taking into account the nature of the dispute between the parties. A labour officer referring a dispute to compulsory arbitration cannot create a new dispute for the parties as was held in <i>Tafadzwa Sakarombe &amp; Anor</i> v <i>Montana Carswell Meats</i> SC 44/20.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As regards the appellant’s second ground of appeal, Mr <i>Madhuku</i> made the following submissions:  a resolution by one party to terminate its contractual obligations cannot bind the innocent party to the contract. It was a serious misdirection by the court <i>a quo</i> that the appellant was bound by the decisions of the respondents in respect of the contract between the parties. Further, a contract need not be in writing. There is no doubt that an oral contract of employment existed between the appellant and the second respondent. The court <i>a quo</i> relied on the absence of a written contract to determine that there was no contract between the appellant and the second respondent. From the circumstances, including the payment of salary and the duties of the appellant <i>vis a vis</i> the second respondent there is no doubt that a contract existed between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Ms.<i> Mahere, </i>for the respondents, submitted; in respect of ground one, that the issue before the arbitrator was to determine whether or not the contract of employment was lawfully terminated. The arbitrator went on to determine that there was a valid contract of employment between the parties, which was not an issue placed before him.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   The conduct of the arbitrator was tantamount to making a contract for the parties, which he or any court or tribunal cannot do as a matter of law. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As regards the purported contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent, that the appellant could not point to a single document that suggested that there was a contract between him and the second respondent. The only contract produced was the one between appellant and first respondent. The argument by the appellant that there is an oral contract is startling.  He failed to present evidence before the Court <i>a quo</i> and this court to prove that there was an oral contract. Thus, there was nothing to enforce between the appellant and the second respondent. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>erred in finding that the arbitrator acted outside his terms of reference in concluding that a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>erred in finding that the appellant did not have a binding contract with the second respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">THE LAW</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The matter before this Court pertains to compulsory arbitration which derives from statute. It only arises after the failure of conciliation and the issuing of a certificate of no settlement (<i>L Madhuku,</i> <i>Labour Law in Zimbabwe </i>at p 362). This was provided for in terms of s 93 (5) of the Labour Act  [<i>Chapter 28.01]</i> before the amendment to the section. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                        </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The author <i>L Madhuku</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> puts it this way:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“This new scheme focuses on the nature of the dispute in determining whether or not to refer it to compulsory arbitration.  Disputes of interest depend on whether or not an essential service is involved… a dispute of interest outside the essential service cannot be referred to compulsory arbitration in the absence of agreement by parties.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Crucial to mention are provisions of s 98 of the Labour Act. The relevant parts read as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“93 Effect of reference to compulsory arbitration under Parts XI and XII</span></span></b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(1)  In this section, “reference to compulsory arbitration”, in relation to a dispute, means a reference made in terms of paragraph (<i>d</i>) of subsection (1) of section <i>eighty-nine </i>or section <i>ninety-three.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Subject to this section, the Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>] shall apply to a dispute referred to compulsory arbitration.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Before referring a dispute to compulsory arbitration, the Labour Court or the labour officer, as the case may be, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity of making representations on the   matter.      </span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(4)     <u>In ordering a dispute to be referred to compulsory arbitration, the Labour Court or labour officer, as the case may be, shall determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference <b>after consultation with the parties to the dispute.”</b></u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                        In <i>Ballantyne Butchery (Pvt) Ltd t/a Danmeats v Edmore Chisvinga &amp; Ors </i>SC 2015 (1) 335 6/15 at p 5 of the cyclostyled judgment, this Court held that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-8.2pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Where a dispute is referred to compulsory arbitration by a labour officer, s 98(4) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] enjoins the officer to determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference after consultation with the parties to the dispute.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The same point was made in <i>Metallon Gold Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Anor v Collen  </i>2015 (1) 509 <i> Gura </i>HH 263/16 at p 5 where  it was held that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">However, the procedure for submission is that the matter commences with conciliation before a labour officer in terms of s 93 of the Labour Act. When conciliation fails, the labour officer then refers the dispute to compulsory arbitration in terms of s 98. In doing so, the labour officer consults the parties for the arbitrator’s terms of reference to be drawn. The arbitrator is confined to the agreed terms of reference during the arbitral process...if the arbitrator goes beyond the terms of reference that may be a ground for objection to the registration of the arbitral award.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b>            </b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b>                  </b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It thus follows that in settling the terms of reference for compulsory arbitration the parties have a role to play. They are consulted by the Labour Court or the labour officer as the case maybe.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is an established principle that an arbitrator is not allowed to venture outside the terms of reference when making a determination. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The law on arbitration and terms of references was succinctly captured at pp 10 to 11 in the case of <i>Munchville Investments (Pvt) Ltd t/a Bernstein Clothing v Chiedza Mugavha </i>SC 62/19 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“As regards the jurisdiction and powers of arbitral tribunals, it must be emphasised that the arbitration process generally is a voluntary and consensual process, both at common law and under the Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>]. This is made clear by s 4(1) of the Act which stipulates that “any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration may be determined by arbitration”. Moreover, by virtue of s 4(3) of the Act, “the fact that an enactment confers jurisdiction on a court or other tribunal to determine any matter shall not, on that ground alone, be construed as preventing the matter from being determined by arbitration”. According to Brand: <i>Labour Dispute Resolution</i> (2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 2008) at p. 163: </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“In private arbitration the arbitration agreement plays a pivotal role. It embodies a description of the dispute to be referred to arbitration, it names the arbitrator, it specifies the terms of reference and arbitrator’s powers, it sets out the process before the actual hearing and finally, it describes the process to be followed during the hearing.”</span></span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In similar vein, as was stated in <i>Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd &amp; Anor</i> v <i>Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd &amp; Anor</i> 2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) at 673 H-I: </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       “The hallmark of arbitration is that it is an adjudication<u>, flowing from the consent of the parties to the arbitration agreement, who define the powers of adjudication, and are equally free to modify or withdraw that power at any time by way of further agreement.</u></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is thus axiomatic that <u>the jurisdiction and powers of an arbitrator are determined by agreement between the disputant parties. The terms of reference define the dispute to be resolved and the manner in which it is to be resolved</u>. <u>The arbitrator’s mandate flows from and is limited by the terms of reference</u>. To put it differently, the arbitrator derives his jurisdiction and powers from the arbitration agreement between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:49.05pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The position is no different under s 93(1) of the Labour Act. <u>The jurisdiction and powers of an arbitrator are established and assumed by dint of the agreement of all the parties involved and their voluntary submission to the arbitral process and its jurisdiction.</u> <u>The arbitrator is not endowed with jurisdiction by the labour officer or conciliator. It is the disputant parties themselves who vest the arbitrator with jurisdiction, notwithstanding any preceding or parallel <i>lis</i> or <i>contestatio</i> between them</u>. In other words, <u>it is the voluntary and consensual nature of arbitration that determines the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and powers where any matter is referred to arbitration in terms of s 93(1) of the Labour Act.” (my underlining)</u></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The above-cited case establishes that the principles applicable to private or voluntary arbitration are the same as those applicable to compulsory arbitration in terms of the Labour Act.   However it must noted that there is a slight different in that in respect of private arbitration there is complete party autonomy with no room for intervention by the arbitrator.   Section   93 (2) of the Act however gives the Labour Court or the Labour Office the right to intervene and determine the terms of reference in consultation with the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator ought not to mischaracterise the disputes between the parties. In <i>Alliance Insurance v Imperial Plastics (Pvt) Ltd </i>SC 30/17 at p 8 of the cyclostyled judgment,<i> </i>the learned MALABA DCJ (as he then was) cited with approval the case of Inter<i> Agric (Private) Limited v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors </i>SC 9/15 wherein the respondent</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, alleging unfair dismissal, filed a grievance with a labour officer, and failing conciliation between the parties, the labour officer referred the matter to compulsory arbitration</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. MALABA DCJ opined:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration Act states that <u>an arbitral award can be set aside if it contains submissions on matters beyond submissions for arbitration</u>. </span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In <i>Inter-Agric (Pvt) Ltd v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors</i> SC 9/15 at p 3 of the cyclostyled judgment GOWORA JA said:</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘In addition, at law, the arbitrator was only competent to determine the dispute between such parties as had been referred to him by the</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> labour</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> officer. Thus, he was confined to his terms of reference. He had no mandate beyond that which had been referred to him.’”(my emphasis)</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">See also <i>Augur Investments OU v Fairclot Investments (Private) Limited  t/a T &amp; C Construction &amp; Anor </i>SC 8/19. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="western" style="margin-top:10px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="AF" style="color:#242121" xml:lang="AF">What emerges from the above authorities is that the arbitrator, in determining the dispute referred to him, is confined to the terms of reference settled for him or her by the Labour Court or the labour officer in consultation with the parties. He is not allowed to stray outside those terms of reference.  For emphasis, he has no mandate beyond that which has been referred to him or her.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="western" style="margin-top:10px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo</i> erred in finding that the arbitrator acted outside his terms of reference in concluding that a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In essence, the principal issue to be addressed is whether or not the arbitrator exceeded his terms of reference and thereby arrived at the wrong conclusions.  Flowing from this is the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Labour Court in not upholding the arbitrator’s award.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appellant submits that the court <i>a quo </i>took a simplistic and fundamentally wrong approach in interpreting the terms of reference. He avers that it is implicit in the terms of reference that what was before the arbitrators were two issues and these are:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Has the contract of employment been terminated?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, is the termination lawful?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Before considering the attack on the arbitrator, that he misconceived the nature of the inquiry and his duties or exceeded his jurisdiction by venturing outside the terms of reference, it is necessary to determine the nature of the inquiry, which was before him. As mentioned at the outset, the arbitrator had to determine whether or not the contract between the appellant and the first respondent had been lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In my view what was implicit in the terms of reference is that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">a)       There had been a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">b)      That the contract was terminated by the employer and that;</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">c)       The appellant`s issue was whether or not the same was lawfully terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is what the arbitrator had to relate to. The court <i>a quo</i> was therefore correct in finding that the arbitrator had misinterpreted the terms of reference. Indeed, the arbitrator erred given the specific terms of reference in proceeding to make the finding that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.  That the contract of employment between the respondent and the claimant still subsists and remains in force.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo c</i>orrectly opined that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“What seems to be coming out of the arbitral award is that, firstly, the arbitrator was not sure of the position of the respondent`s employment status. Secondly, the arbitrator was not sure of the propriety of the respondent`s salary apart from commenting that the employee was entitled to continue working while the Board made its deliberations. His position was that the contract was never terminated...</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">When parties presented the above as a term of reference, it was clear on their minds that the respondent`s contract of employment with the first appellant had been terminated. What required determination was whether or not such termination was lawful.”</span></span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr <i>Madhuku </i>had this to say about the above finding, in para 9 of the appellant’s Heads of Argument:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The above misdirection was the source of the court <i>a quo’s</i> error. Parties never presented any terms of reference. This was compulsory arbitration. It was the labour officer who formulated the terms of reference after taking into account the nature of the dispute between the parties,”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He further contended that instead of taking into account the nature of the dispute after conciliation, the court <i>a quo</i> applied the wrong principle, namely taking into account a non-existent ‘intention of the parties’. The dispute was referred to the labour officer for conciliation as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(i)  Whether or not our client’s contract of employment was terminated and if so, when?” </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He concluded by submitting that taking into account the nature of the dispute the arbitrator was correct to include a determination of whether or not the employment had been terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">What Mr <i>Madhuku</i> over-looked is the role of the parties to the dispute, in the settlement of terms of reference to be referred to an arbitrator. S 98 (4) makes provision for the labour officer ‘to determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference after consultation with the parties to the dispute.’ Whilst it is the function of the labour officer to determine the terms of reference, he or she does not do it by himself or herself. He has to do so in consultation with the parties. The parties input in the final product. See <i>Ballantyne Butchery (Private)</i> <i>Limited</i> (<i>Supra).</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">There is no indication on the record that the appellant objected to the terms of reference as presented to the arbitrator at the beginning of the arbitration process. The arbitrator, in his award, captures the terms of reference as referred to him by the labour officer. It is during the analysis stage that he changes course and starts to deal with whether the appellant’s contract had been terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator clearly fell outside the terms of reference contrary to the settled position of the law which states that arbitrators should confine themselves to the presented terms of reference. See <i>Munchville Investments (Private) Limited</i> (<i>Supra)</i>. He could not go behind what was before him to ascertain what it is that was referred to the labour officer as was suggested by Mr <i>Madhuku</i>. The arbitrator was not asked to determine whether or not the contract between the parties still subsisted but was required to determine whether or not the contract between the parties was <u>lawfully terminated</u>. In light of the foregoing, the court <i>a quo’s </i>finding cannot be faulted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>further found that equally disturbing is that the arbitrator`s conduct was tantamount to making a contract for the parties which neither he nor any court or tribunal can do as a matter of law. It remarked as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Making contracts for parties is not the duty of an adjudicating authority. An adjudicating authority deals with disputes arising from contracts or indeed interprets terms of contract where parties need interpretation of the terms thereof in the context of disputes between them. They do not make contracts for parties. In the <i>Kundai Magodora case </i>(above) at 403 C-D the Supreme Court stated as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘In principle, it is not open to courts to rewrite a contract entered into between the parties or to excuse any of them from the consequences of the contract that they have freely and voluntarily accepted even if they are shown to be onerous or oppressive.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-top:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As is appositely cautioned by Christie: <i>The Law of Contract in South Africa</i> (5 ed.) at p. 366:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The fundamental rule that the court may not make a contract for the parties is a salutary one, the principle of which has probably never been seriously questioned. It is unthinkable that the courts should not only tell the parties what they ought to have done but then make them do it by enforcing the court’s idea of what the contract ought to have been.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Indeed, the arbitrator misdirected himself by concluding that the contract was never terminated. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was not within his remit to exceed his mandate</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> misconceived the whole nature of the inquiry or his duty in connection therewith. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Thus, the first ground of appeal has no merit and must fail.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       <b>Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>misdirected itself and erred in finding that the appellant did not have a binding contract with the second respondent.</b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appellant argues that the misdirection in this regard is two-pronged:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the resolution by one party to terminate its contractual obligations cannot bind the innocent party to the contract and that it was a serious misdirection to say that the appellant was bound by the decisions of the respondents in respect of the second contract between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That a contract of employment need not be in writing and thus, it was a misdirection by the court <i>a quo </i>to find that since there was no written contract of employment, between the appellant and the second respondent there was no contract to speak of.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was Mr <i>Madhuku</i>’s contention that the appellant was employed by the two respondents. He further submitted that the court <i>a quo</i> did not lay a basis for interfering with the factual findings made by the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Per contra, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Ms <i>Mahere</i> submitted that the appellant did not have a contract of employment with the second respondent.  He could not point to a single document which indicated that he had a contract with the second respondent. Further, she submitted that this was a factual finding correctly made by the court <i>a quo. </i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is thus necessary yet again to refer to the terms of reference as placed before the arbitrator. These were:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the Claimant`s contract of employment is enforceable against the Respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, whether or not the Claimant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator found that the contract was enforceable, that it was never terminated and that the claimant is entitled to payment of salaries and benefits as claimed. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>made a finding that there was a contract of employment between the first respondent and the appellant and not between the second respondent and the appellant. It further found that what was clear from the correspondence between the appellant and the board, regarding his retirement and extension of the retirement age, were between the appellant and the first respondent</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. The court <i>a quo </i>in reaching its finding that there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent made reference to letters and correspondence filed of record and remarked:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“What is important to note is that the appellant`s Board observed that the respondent had reached retirement age. The Board then resolved to extend the respondent`s (appellant in this matter) tenure with the society (PSMAS) (1<sup>st</sup> appellant) for a further ten years. The extension contract was not with the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant. That Board thereafter reversed its decision and decided to abide by the provisions of the enabling Retirement Policy of the Society 4/2003”.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Further down the court stated;</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<u>From what is on record</u>, there was a contract between respondent and the Society i.e. the first appellant and the respondent but not between 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant and the respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That being the position, there was nothing to enforce between respondent and the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant. Nothing was terminated. Under the circumstances, it is my respectful view that the Learned Arbitrator fell into error when he determined that there was an enforceable contract of employment between the parties i.e between respondent and the second appellant. My finding is that there was no separate binding contract of employment between the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant and the respondent.”( my own underlining)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">find nothing to confirm the existence of a contract of employment with the second respondent either, and there are strong indications that there was no such agreement. Indeed, appellant has not set out what the terms of this agreement with second respondent are. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I opine that if there was a written contract between the appellant and first respondent, then there would have been a written contract between the appellant and the second respondent as well. As already alluded to earlier on, not a single letter was written by the appellant seeking to enforce a contract of employment against the second respondent. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Thus, the court <i>a quo`</i>s finding that there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent and consequently that there was no entitlement for payment of the alleged salary due to him, cannot be faulted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="line-height:200%"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is an established principle in our law that an appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the court <i>a quo</i> and the factual findings made by it unless those findings were grossly unreasonable and the decision is so outrageous in its defiance of logic that no sensible person who would have applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. This position was discussed and justified in <i>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe</i></span></span></span><i> </i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S) at p 670<b><i>,</i></b><i> </i>where<i> </i>KORSAH JA remarked<i>:</i></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> “…an appellate court will not interfere with a decision of a trial court based purely on a finding of fact unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the evidence placed before the trial court, the finding complained of is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at such a conclusion.”</span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is my view that the court <i>a quo </i>had a basis to interfere with the factual findings of the arbitrator. From what is on record there is nothing to indicate that there was a contract between the appellant and the second respondent, written or otherwise. The appellant in the “Claimant’s Address” to the arbitrator did not state whether he had a contract with the second respondent. He did not plead the terms of the oral contract if indeed it existed.  He did not complain about unlawful termination of his contract with the second respondent.  He just claimed non-payment of salaries. The arbitrator arrived at a decision without regard to the evidence before him, which is a ground for interference with a factual finding. Thus, the decision of the court <i>a quo </i>is unassailable. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In light of the above, the second ground of appeal being unmeritorious, must fail. Costs will follow the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the result, I make the following order:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MATHONSI  JA:</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                                    I AGREE</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAKUNYE JA:</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                               I AGREE</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Venturas and Samukange, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">appellant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Muzangaza, Mandaza and Tomana Legal Practitioners, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent’s legal practitioners.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">Labour Law in Zimbabwe p 363</span></span></span></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-183ee1a5e79819f1f3bee42c8ea84858e9f63c80b7566c7987851cad2309f96c"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB">Judgment No. SC 5/22 </span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB">Civil Appeal No. SC 82/20</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DISTRIBUTABLE</span></span></span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">:            (5)</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CUTHBERT      ELKANA     DUBE</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">    PREMIER     SERVICE     MEDICAL      AID      SOCIETY     (2)     PREMIER      SERVICE      MEDICAL      INVESTMENTS</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAKONI JA, MATHONSI JA &amp; CHITAKUNYE JA</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE: 15 OCTOBER 2021 &amp; 24 JANUARY 2022</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">L. Madhuku</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the appellant</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">F. Mahere</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the first and second respondents</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAKONI  JA:            </span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Labour Court  (the court <i>a quo</i>) which allowed two appeals filed in that court by the first and second respondents in terms of s 98 (10) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>].  It set aside the two awards made in favour of the appellant and in their place substituted them with an order dismissing the appellant`s claims before the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">FACTUAL BACKGROUND</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first respondent is a medical aid society registered in terms of the Medical Services Act, [<i>Chapter 15:13</i>]. The second respondent is the investment vehicle of the first respondent.  Both respondents are managed by two separate boards of directors. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            It is common cause that the appellant was the Chief Executive Officer of the first respondent in terms of a contract of employment. He also drew a salary from the second respondent in unclear circumstances. He attained the retirement age of (60 years) in December 2013 in terms of the Retirement Policy of the Society 4/2003 of the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 March 2013, both boards of directors of the respondents unanimously extended the appellant`s tenure of office by a further ten years. The new contract commenced from 1 January 2014 and would end on 31 December 2024. At the beginning of 2014, the appellant commenced the extended employment contract. The parties also reached an agreement that the appellant`s monthly salary would be US$60 000.00 per month effective January 2014 along with other benefits. It was later reduced to US$43 000.00. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Following allegations that the appellant was taking an exorbitant salary of US$92 000.00 every month before allowances without the knowledge of the full board, other than two of its members, the boards withdrew their earlier decision of extending the appellant`s contract of employment. They relied on the provisions of the Retirement Policy to rescind the extension of the employment contract. The appellant was thus requested to take a pre-retirement paid leave. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In response, the appellant, through a letter dated 20 February 2014 addressed to the first respondent, claimed that he had a subsisting contract of employment for a period of ten years which commenced on 1 January 2014. He insisted that the contract had not been terminated in any way and consequently he would abide by it and continue to execute his duties in terms of the same until its expiry. No such letter was written to the second respondent. Consequently, a dispute arose between the appellant and the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 17 February 2015, the dispute between the appellant and the first respondent was referred to compulsory arbitration. The terms of reference were as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“To determine whether or not the claimant`s (the appellant in this matter) contract of employment was lawfully terminated;</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2" style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appropriate remedy”</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 March 2015, a dispute in the matter between the appellant and the second respondent was referred to compulsory arbitration.  It is not clear from the record how the dispute had arisen. The terms of reference were as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Whether or not the appellant`s contract of employment was enforceable against the second respondent;</span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, whether or not the claimant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.”</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On 14 April 2015 the arbitrator issued awards in respect of both matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the matter between the appellant and the first respondent the arbitral award was to the effect that the contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted and thus remained in force.  He further ordered that the first respondent  pay the appellant all salaries and benefits from the date these were last paid at the salary scale of US$92 000.00 per month.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the matter between the appellant and the second respondent the arbitral award was to the effect that the appellant`s contract of employment was enforceable against the second respondent and that the contract was never terminated thereby rendering the appellant entitled to payment of salaries and benefits as claimed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:120px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Aggrieved, the first and second respondents independently appealed against the two arbitral awards to the Labour Court under LC/H/348/15 and LC/H/349/15 respectively. The two appeals were consolidated for the sake of convenience. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT <i>A QUO</i>          </span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first respondent, in its heads of argument before the court <i>a quo, </i>in which it was the first appellant, argued that the arbitrator made a determination that ran foul of the issue presented before him. It submitted that the issue before the arbitrator was whether or not the employment contract between the first respondent and the appellant was lawfully terminated. Thus, it insisted that the arbitrator fell into error when he determined that there was a valid and enforceable contract between the parties whereas it was common cause between the parties that no contract still existed. The first respondent contended that the arbitrator was bound by the terms of reference and had no authority to reformat the issues as presented to him by the parties. It was also the first respondent`s case that no evidence was tendered to justify the amount of US$92 000.00 per month which was awarded to the appellant by the arbitrator. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The second respondent largely associated itself with the arguments made by the first respondent regarding the arbitrator straying from the terms of reference. In addition to that, the second respondent submitted that the arbitrator missed the import of the issues referred to him and came to the conclusion that there existed a contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent. The second respondent further submitted that it was simply the investment vehicle of the first respondent and used to contribute to the appellant`s salary at the request or on the instructions of the appellant. Thus it was the second respondent`s submission that these remittances did not make it the appellant`s employer.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Per Contra, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the appellant submitted that the arbitrator correctly determined the issues before him. He submitted that the issues referred to the arbitrator were whether or not the appellant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and to determine the appropriate remedy. He further submitted that determining whether or not the contract was valid was the first stage of inquiry which would then lead to the conclusion of whether or not the same was lawfully terminated. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Regarding the second respondent, he submitted that the evidence placed before the arbitrator of termination of the contract in the form of a letter was not sufficient enough to prove that the same was terminated in terms of the law. The appellant insisted that a contract of employment could only be terminated by mutual consent, death, dismissal through a formal disciplinary hearing or resignation. Thus he proffered that a valid contract still existed as the second respondent failed to prove termination. The appellant further submitted that the second respondent was his employer by extension as management of the same reported directly to him. It followed that his contract of employment with the second respondent was valid and enforceable.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DETERMINATION OF THE COURT <i>A QUO</i></span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The court <i>a quo </i>examined the terms of reference as placed before the arbitrator by the parties. With respect to the first respondent, the court reasoned that it was clear in the parties` minds that the contract of employment had been terminated and what required determination was whether or not such termination was lawful. The court further reasoned that the arbitrator fell outside the terms of reference by making a determination that the contract of employment still subsisted and remained in force. The court relied on the case of <i>C Kambuzuma and Ors v The Athol Evans Hospital Home Complex </i>SC 118/04 in its reasoning that the arbitrator ought to have confined himself to the terms of reference and not go further than that.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In addition, the court <i>a quo</i> held that the arbitrator, by making a finding that there was still a valid contract in existence between the parties, effectively made a new employment contract for the parties contrary to the Supreme Court decision in the matter between <i>Kundai Magodora &amp; Ors v Care International Zimbabwe </i>2014 (1) ZLR 397.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">With respect to the second respondent, the court <i>a quo </i>made a finding that, as was apparent from the record, the second respondent did not extend the appellants tenure. It effectively concluded that there was nothing to enforce between the appellant and the second respondent as there was never an employment contract between them. Consequently, the court found that there was nothing to terminate and therefore the appellant was not entitled to anything from the second respondent. In the result it allowed the appeals and set aside the arbitral awards.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This prompted the appellant to note the present appeal on the following grounds:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">GROUNDS OF APPEAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.     The court <i>a quo </i>misdirected itself and erred at law in finding that the decision of the arbitrator that there was still a subsisting contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent was outside the arbitrator`s terms of reference.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>erred by making a determination that there was no binding contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent.”</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-28.9pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In addressing the first ground of appeal Mr <i>Madhuku </i>for the appellant made the following submissions; the issue before the court was a question of interpretation of the terms of reference. The terms of reference were quite straightforward and had inherent in them two questions namely:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> Has the contract of employment been terminated?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> If so was the termination lawful?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A term of reference in terms of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter (28; 01</i>)] (the Act) is statutorily regulated and must be interpreted in terms of the scheme under Part XII of the Act. What has to be resolved is the dispute that was referred to conciliation. The court <i>a quo</i> fell into error by treating this as voluntary arbitration in which the terms of reference were as a result of the meeting of the minds of the parties.  To the contrary this was a compulsory arbitration in terms of the Act where the labour officer formulates the terms of reference after taking into account the nature of the dispute between the parties. A labour officer referring a dispute to compulsory arbitration cannot create a new dispute for the parties as was held in <i>Tafadzwa Sakarombe &amp; Anor</i> v <i>Montana Carswell Meats</i> SC 44/20.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As regards the appellant’s second ground of appeal, Mr <i>Madhuku</i> made the following submissions:  a resolution by one party to terminate its contractual obligations cannot bind the innocent party to the contract. It was a serious misdirection by the court <i>a quo</i> that the appellant was bound by the decisions of the respondents in respect of the contract between the parties. Further, a contract need not be in writing. There is no doubt that an oral contract of employment existed between the appellant and the second respondent. The court <i>a quo</i> relied on the absence of a written contract to determine that there was no contract between the appellant and the second respondent. From the circumstances, including the payment of salary and the duties of the appellant <i>vis a vis</i> the second respondent there is no doubt that a contract existed between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Ms.<i> Mahere, </i>for the respondents, submitted; in respect of ground one, that the issue before the arbitrator was to determine whether or not the contract of employment was lawfully terminated. The arbitrator went on to determine that there was a valid contract of employment between the parties, which was not an issue placed before him.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   The conduct of the arbitrator was tantamount to making a contract for the parties, which he or any court or tribunal cannot do as a matter of law. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As regards the purported contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent, that the appellant could not point to a single document that suggested that there was a contract between him and the second respondent. The only contract produced was the one between appellant and first respondent. The argument by the appellant that there is an oral contract is startling.  He failed to present evidence before the Court <i>a quo</i> and this court to prove that there was an oral contract. Thus, there was nothing to enforce between the appellant and the second respondent. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>erred in finding that the arbitrator acted outside his terms of reference in concluding that a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>erred in finding that the appellant did not have a binding contract with the second respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">THE LAW</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The matter before this Court pertains to compulsory arbitration which derives from statute. It only arises after the failure of conciliation and the issuing of a certificate of no settlement (<i>L Madhuku,</i> <i>Labour Law in Zimbabwe </i>at p 362). This was provided for in terms of s 93 (5) of the Labour Act  [<i>Chapter 28.01]</i> before the amendment to the section. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                        </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The author <i>L Madhuku</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> puts it this way:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“This new scheme focuses on the nature of the dispute in determining whether or not to refer it to compulsory arbitration.  Disputes of interest depend on whether or not an essential service is involved… a dispute of interest outside the essential service cannot be referred to compulsory arbitration in the absence of agreement by parties.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Crucial to mention are provisions of s 98 of the Labour Act. The relevant parts read as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“93 Effect of reference to compulsory arbitration under Parts XI and XII</span></span></b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(1)  In this section, “reference to compulsory arbitration”, in relation to a dispute, means a reference made in terms of paragraph (<i>d</i>) of subsection (1) of section <i>eighty-nine </i>or section <i>ninety-three.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Subject to this section, the Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>] shall apply to a dispute referred to compulsory arbitration.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Before referring a dispute to compulsory arbitration, the Labour Court or the labour officer, as the case may be, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity of making representations on the   matter.      </span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">(4)     <u>In ordering a dispute to be referred to compulsory arbitration, the Labour Court or labour officer, as the case may be, shall determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference <b>after consultation with the parties to the dispute.”</b></u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                        In <i>Ballantyne Butchery (Pvt) Ltd t/a Danmeats v Edmore Chisvinga &amp; Ors </i>SC 2015 (1) 335 6/15 at p 5 of the cyclostyled judgment, this Court held that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-8.2pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Where a dispute is referred to compulsory arbitration by a labour officer, s 98(4) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] enjoins the officer to determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference after consultation with the parties to the dispute.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The same point was made in <i>Metallon Gold Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Anor v Collen  </i>2015 (1) 509 <i> Gura </i>HH 263/16 at p 5 where  it was held that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">However, the procedure for submission is that the matter commences with conciliation before a labour officer in terms of s 93 of the Labour Act. When conciliation fails, the labour officer then refers the dispute to compulsory arbitration in terms of s 98. In doing so, the labour officer consults the parties for the arbitrator’s terms of reference to be drawn. The arbitrator is confined to the agreed terms of reference during the arbitral process...if the arbitrator goes beyond the terms of reference that may be a ground for objection to the registration of the arbitral award.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b>            </b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b>                  </b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It thus follows that in settling the terms of reference for compulsory arbitration the parties have a role to play. They are consulted by the Labour Court or the labour officer as the case maybe.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is an established principle that an arbitrator is not allowed to venture outside the terms of reference when making a determination. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The law on arbitration and terms of references was succinctly captured at pp 10 to 11 in the case of <i>Munchville Investments (Pvt) Ltd t/a Bernstein Clothing v Chiedza Mugavha </i>SC 62/19 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“As regards the jurisdiction and powers of arbitral tribunals, it must be emphasised that the arbitration process generally is a voluntary and consensual process, both at common law and under the Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>]. This is made clear by s 4(1) of the Act which stipulates that “any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration may be determined by arbitration”. Moreover, by virtue of s 4(3) of the Act, “the fact that an enactment confers jurisdiction on a court or other tribunal to determine any matter shall not, on that ground alone, be construed as preventing the matter from being determined by arbitration”. According to Brand: <i>Labour Dispute Resolution</i> (2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 2008) at p. 163: </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“In private arbitration the arbitration agreement plays a pivotal role. It embodies a description of the dispute to be referred to arbitration, it names the arbitrator, it specifies the terms of reference and arbitrator’s powers, it sets out the process before the actual hearing and finally, it describes the process to be followed during the hearing.”</span></span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In similar vein, as was stated in <i>Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd &amp; Anor</i> v <i>Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd &amp; Anor</i> 2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) at 673 H-I: </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       “The hallmark of arbitration is that it is an adjudication<u>, flowing from the consent of the parties to the arbitration agreement, who define the powers of adjudication, and are equally free to modify or withdraw that power at any time by way of further agreement.</u></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is thus axiomatic that <u>the jurisdiction and powers of an arbitrator are determined by agreement between the disputant parties. The terms of reference define the dispute to be resolved and the manner in which it is to be resolved</u>. <u>The arbitrator’s mandate flows from and is limited by the terms of reference</u>. To put it differently, the arbitrator derives his jurisdiction and powers from the arbitration agreement between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:49.05pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The position is no different under s 93(1) of the Labour Act. <u>The jurisdiction and powers of an arbitrator are established and assumed by dint of the agreement of all the parties involved and their voluntary submission to the arbitral process and its jurisdiction.</u> <u>The arbitrator is not endowed with jurisdiction by the labour officer or conciliator. It is the disputant parties themselves who vest the arbitrator with jurisdiction, notwithstanding any preceding or parallel <i>lis</i> or <i>contestatio</i> between them</u>. In other words, <u>it is the voluntary and consensual nature of arbitration that determines the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and powers where any matter is referred to arbitration in terms of s 93(1) of the Labour Act.” (my underlining)</u></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The above-cited case establishes that the principles applicable to private or voluntary arbitration are the same as those applicable to compulsory arbitration in terms of the Labour Act.   However it must noted that there is a slight different in that in respect of private arbitration there is complete party autonomy with no room for intervention by the arbitrator.   Section   93 (2) of the Act however gives the Labour Court or the Labour Office the right to intervene and determine the terms of reference in consultation with the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator ought not to mischaracterise the disputes between the parties. In <i>Alliance Insurance v Imperial Plastics (Pvt) Ltd </i>SC 30/17 at p 8 of the cyclostyled judgment,<i> </i>the learned MALABA DCJ (as he then was) cited with approval the case of Inter<i> Agric (Private) Limited v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors </i>SC 9/15 wherein the respondent</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, alleging unfair dismissal, filed a grievance with a labour officer, and failing conciliation between the parties, the labour officer referred the matter to compulsory arbitration</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. MALABA DCJ opined:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration Act states that <u>an arbitral award can be set aside if it contains submissions on matters beyond submissions for arbitration</u>. </span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In <i>Inter-Agric (Pvt) Ltd v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors</i> SC 9/15 at p 3 of the cyclostyled judgment GOWORA JA said:</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘In addition, at law, the arbitrator was only competent to determine the dispute between such parties as had been referred to him by the</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> labour</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> officer. Thus, he was confined to his terms of reference. He had no mandate beyond that which had been referred to him.’”(my emphasis)</span></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">See also <i>Augur Investments OU v Fairclot Investments (Private) Limited  t/a T &amp; C Construction &amp; Anor </i>SC 8/19. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="western" style="margin-top:10px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="background:white"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="AF" style="color:#242121" xml:lang="AF">What emerges from the above authorities is that the arbitrator, in determining the dispute referred to him, is confined to the terms of reference settled for him or her by the Labour Court or the labour officer in consultation with the parties. He is not allowed to stray outside those terms of reference.  For emphasis, he has no mandate beyond that which has been referred to him or her.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="western" style="margin-top:10px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the court <i>a quo</i> erred in finding that the arbitrator acted outside his terms of reference in concluding that a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent still subsisted</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In essence, the principal issue to be addressed is whether or not the arbitrator exceeded his terms of reference and thereby arrived at the wrong conclusions.  Flowing from this is the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Labour Court in not upholding the arbitrator’s award.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appellant submits that the court <i>a quo </i>took a simplistic and fundamentally wrong approach in interpreting the terms of reference. He avers that it is implicit in the terms of reference that what was before the arbitrators were two issues and these are:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Has the contract of employment been terminated?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:56px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, is the termination lawful?</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Before considering the attack on the arbitrator, that he misconceived the nature of the inquiry and his duties or exceeded his jurisdiction by venturing outside the terms of reference, it is necessary to determine the nature of the inquiry, which was before him. As mentioned at the outset, the arbitrator had to determine whether or not the contract between the appellant and the first respondent had been lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In my view what was implicit in the terms of reference is that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">a)       There had been a contract of employment between the appellant and the first respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">b)      That the contract was terminated by the employer and that;</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">c)       The appellant`s issue was whether or not the same was lawfully terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This is what the arbitrator had to relate to. The court <i>a quo</i> was therefore correct in finding that the arbitrator had misinterpreted the terms of reference. Indeed, the arbitrator erred given the specific terms of reference in proceeding to make the finding that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1.  That the contract of employment between the respondent and the claimant still subsists and remains in force.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo c</i>orrectly opined that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“What seems to be coming out of the arbitral award is that, firstly, the arbitrator was not sure of the position of the respondent`s employment status. Secondly, the arbitrator was not sure of the propriety of the respondent`s salary apart from commenting that the employee was entitled to continue working while the Board made its deliberations. His position was that the contract was never terminated...</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">When parties presented the above as a term of reference, it was clear on their minds that the respondent`s contract of employment with the first appellant had been terminated. What required determination was whether or not such termination was lawful.”</span></span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr <i>Madhuku </i>had this to say about the above finding, in para 9 of the appellant’s Heads of Argument:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The above misdirection was the source of the court <i>a quo’s</i> error. Parties never presented any terms of reference. This was compulsory arbitration. It was the labour officer who formulated the terms of reference after taking into account the nature of the dispute between the parties,”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He further contended that instead of taking into account the nature of the dispute after conciliation, the court <i>a quo</i> applied the wrong principle, namely taking into account a non-existent ‘intention of the parties’. The dispute was referred to the labour officer for conciliation as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“(i)  Whether or not our client’s contract of employment was terminated and if so, when?” </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He concluded by submitting that taking into account the nature of the dispute the arbitrator was correct to include a determination of whether or not the employment had been terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">What Mr <i>Madhuku</i> over-looked is the role of the parties to the dispute, in the settlement of terms of reference to be referred to an arbitrator. S 98 (4) makes provision for the labour officer ‘to determine the arbitrator’s terms of reference after consultation with the parties to the dispute.’ Whilst it is the function of the labour officer to determine the terms of reference, he or she does not do it by himself or herself. He has to do so in consultation with the parties. The parties input in the final product. See <i>Ballantyne Butchery (Private)</i> <i>Limited</i> (<i>Supra).</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">There is no indication on the record that the appellant objected to the terms of reference as presented to the arbitrator at the beginning of the arbitration process. The arbitrator, in his award, captures the terms of reference as referred to him by the labour officer. It is during the analysis stage that he changes course and starts to deal with whether the appellant’s contract had been terminated.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator clearly fell outside the terms of reference contrary to the settled position of the law which states that arbitrators should confine themselves to the presented terms of reference. See <i>Munchville Investments (Private) Limited</i> (<i>Supra)</i>. He could not go behind what was before him to ascertain what it is that was referred to the labour officer as was suggested by Mr <i>Madhuku</i>. The arbitrator was not asked to determine whether or not the contract between the parties still subsisted but was required to determine whether or not the contract between the parties was <u>lawfully terminated</u>. In light of the foregoing, the court <i>a quo’s </i>finding cannot be faulted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>further found that equally disturbing is that the arbitrator`s conduct was tantamount to making a contract for the parties which neither he nor any court or tribunal can do as a matter of law. It remarked as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“Making contracts for parties is not the duty of an adjudicating authority. An adjudicating authority deals with disputes arising from contracts or indeed interprets terms of contract where parties need interpretation of the terms thereof in the context of disputes between them. They do not make contracts for parties. In the <i>Kundai Magodora case </i>(above) at 403 C-D the Supreme Court stated as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">‘In principle, it is not open to courts to rewrite a contract entered into between the parties or to excuse any of them from the consequences of the contract that they have freely and voluntarily accepted even if they are shown to be onerous or oppressive.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-top:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">As is appositely cautioned by Christie: <i>The Law of Contract in South Africa</i> (5 ed.) at p. 366:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The fundamental rule that the court may not make a contract for the parties is a salutary one, the principle of which has probably never been seriously questioned. It is unthinkable that the courts should not only tell the parties what they ought to have done but then make them do it by enforcing the court’s idea of what the contract ought to have been.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Indeed, the arbitrator misdirected himself by concluding that the contract was never terminated. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was not within his remit to exceed his mandate</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> misconceived the whole nature of the inquiry or his duty in connection therewith. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Thus, the first ground of appeal has no merit and must fail.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">2.       <b>Whether or not the court <i>a quo </i>misdirected itself and erred in finding that the appellant did not have a binding contract with the second respondent.</b></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appellant argues that the misdirection in this regard is two-pronged:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the resolution by one party to terminate its contractual obligations cannot bind the innocent party to the contract and that it was a serious misdirection to say that the appellant was bound by the decisions of the respondents in respect of the second contract between the parties.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That a contract of employment need not be in writing and thus, it was a misdirection by the court <i>a quo </i>to find that since there was no written contract of employment, between the appellant and the second respondent there was no contract to speak of.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was Mr <i>Madhuku</i>’s contention that the appellant was employed by the two respondents. He further submitted that the court <i>a quo</i> did not lay a basis for interfering with the factual findings made by the arbitrator.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Per contra, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Ms <i>Mahere</i> submitted that the appellant did not have a contract of employment with the second respondent.  He could not point to a single document which indicated that he had a contract with the second respondent. Further, she submitted that this was a factual finding correctly made by the court <i>a quo. </i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is thus necessary yet again to refer to the terms of reference as placed before the arbitrator. These were:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <ol><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Whether or not the Claimant`s contract of employment is enforceable against the Respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="2"><li style="margin-left:36px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">If so, whether or not the Claimant`s contract of employment was lawfully terminated and the remedy thereof.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitrator found that the contract was enforceable, that it was never terminated and that the claimant is entitled to payment of salaries and benefits as claimed. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The court <i>a quo </i>made a finding that there was a contract of employment between the first respondent and the appellant and not between the second respondent and the appellant. It further found that what was clear from the correspondence between the appellant and the board, regarding his retirement and extension of the retirement age, were between the appellant and the first respondent</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. The court <i>a quo </i>in reaching its finding that there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent made reference to letters and correspondence filed of record and remarked:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.05pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“What is important to note is that the appellant`s Board observed that the respondent had reached retirement age. The Board then resolved to extend the respondent`s (appellant in this matter) tenure with the society (PSMAS) (1<sup>st</sup> appellant) for a further ten years. The extension contract was not with the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant. That Board thereafter reversed its decision and decided to abide by the provisions of the enabling Retirement Policy of the Society 4/2003”.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Further down the court stated;</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:20.7pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:38px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<u>From what is on record</u>, there was a contract between respondent and the Society i.e. the first appellant and the respondent but not between 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant and the respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That being the position, there was nothing to enforce between respondent and the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant. Nothing was terminated. Under the circumstances, it is my respectful view that the Learned Arbitrator fell into error when he determined that there was an enforceable contract of employment between the parties i.e between respondent and the second appellant. My finding is that there was no separate binding contract of employment between the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant and the respondent.”( my own underlining)</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm; margin-bottom:11px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">find nothing to confirm the existence of a contract of employment with the second respondent either, and there are strong indications that there was no such agreement. Indeed, appellant has not set out what the terms of this agreement with second respondent are. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I opine that if there was a written contract between the appellant and first respondent, then there would have been a written contract between the appellant and the second respondent as well. As already alluded to earlier on, not a single letter was written by the appellant seeking to enforce a contract of employment against the second respondent. </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Thus, the court <i>a quo`</i>s finding that there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the second respondent and consequently that there was no entitlement for payment of the alleged salary due to him, cannot be faulted.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:63.8pt; margin-bottom:11px"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="line-height:200%"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is an established principle in our law that an appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the court <i>a quo</i> and the factual findings made by it unless those findings were grossly unreasonable and the decision is so outrageous in its defiance of logic that no sensible person who would have applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. This position was discussed and justified in <i>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe</i></span></span></span><i> </i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S) at p 670<b><i>,</i></b><i> </i>where<i> </i>KORSAH JA remarked<i>:</i></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-7.65pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> “…an appellate court will not interfere with a decision of a trial court based purely on a finding of fact unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the evidence placed before the trial court, the finding complained of is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at such a conclusion.”</span></span></span></p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify; text-indent:18.0pt"> </p> <p class="CxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is my view that the court <i>a quo </i>had a basis to interfere with the factual findings of the arbitrator. From what is on record there is nothing to indicate that there was a contract between the appellant and the second respondent, written or otherwise. The appellant in the “Claimant’s Address” to the arbitrator did not state whether he had a contract with the second respondent. He did not plead the terms of the oral contract if indeed it existed.  He did not complain about unlawful termination of his contract with the second respondent.  He just claimed non-payment of salaries. The arbitrator arrived at a decision without regard to the evidence before him, which is a ground for interference with a factual finding. Thus, the decision of the court <i>a quo </i>is unassailable. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In light of the above, the second ground of appeal being unmeritorious, must fail. Costs will follow the cause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:1.0cm"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:2.0cm"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the result, I make the following order:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is ordered that:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MATHONSI  JA:</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                                    I AGREE</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:24px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAKUNYE JA:</span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">                               I AGREE</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Venturas and Samukange, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">appellant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Muzangaza, Mandaza and Tomana Legal Practitioners, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent’s legal practitioners.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-GB"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">Labour Law in Zimbabwe p 363</span></span></span></p> </div> </div></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:37:04 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 11540 at http://www.zimlii.org Maphisa v Bulawayo Municipal Commercial Undertaking (SC 14 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 524 of 2017) [2017] ZWSC 14 (27 November 2017); http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2017/14 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Maphisa v Bulawayo Municipal Commercial Undertaking (SC 14 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 524 of 2017) [2017] ZWSC 14 (27 November 2017);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1459" hreflang="en">Arbitration</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2124" hreflang="x-default">Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2385" hreflang="x-default">Review</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2386" hreflang="x-default">Proceedings brought on review</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2017/14/2017-zwsc-14.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=24725">2017-zwsc-14.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2017/14/2017-zwsc-14.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=82775">2017-zwsc-14.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>EX TEMPORE</strong></p> <p><strong>ELPHAS     MAVUNE     MAPHISA </strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO     MUNICIPAL     COMMERCIAL     UNDERTAKING</strong></p> <p><strong>GORDON     GEDDES</strong></p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA, PATEL JA &amp; ZIYAMBI AJA</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO, 27 NOVEMBER 2017</strong></p> <p>The appellant in person</p> <p><em>L. Nkomo</em>, for the first respondent</p> <p>No appearance for the second respondent</p> <p>                        <strong>PATEL JA:   </strong>This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court, dated 13 July 2017, dismissing an application for review of the determination of an arbitrator which had dismissed preliminary issues raised by the appellant relating, <em>inter alia</em>, to the legal status of the first respondent and its capacity to enforce a franchise agreement between the parties.</p> <p>                        The court <em>a quo</em> found that the appellant had proceeded erroneously by not invoking the procedure prescribed for setting aside arbitral awards under Article 34 of the Model Law scheduled to the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>]. The court further found that, even if the application had been mounted in terms of ss 26 and 27 of the High Court Act [<em>Chapter 7:06</em>], the appellant had not alleged any valid grounds of review to set aside the determination of the arbitrator. In our view, we entirely agree with the court <em>a quo </em>that there was no proper review before it. We also take the view that the court should have stopped after making those findings and should not have proceeded to deal with the merits of the review application.</p> <p>                        We note that the appeal herein is stated to be against the whole judgment of the High Court.  However, the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal are confined to the merits of the arbitrator’s determination on the preliminary issues. They do not in any way impugn the main findings of the court relating to its powers of review and the impropriety of the purported review application before it.</p> <p>                        We also note that, following the determination of the arbitrator on the preliminary points, the arbitration proceedings were continued with the active participation of the appellant. The arbitrator then rendered his final award on 3 December 2015. Thereafter, the appellant instituted further review proceedings on 24 May 2016 against the final award. These proceedings were also dismissed by the High Court on 27 October 2016 on the basis that the review was improperly instituted. Both the final award of the arbitrator and the judgment of the High Court remain extant. As was grudgingly conceded by the appellant, this fact renders the present appeal academic and futile.</p> <p>                        As regards costs, Mr <em>Nkomo</em>, for the first respondent, sought costs on a punitive scale.  The reasons therefore were that the appellant has yet to relinquish the franchised premises, notwithstanding his contention that the franchise agreement is a nullity, and that he has obstinately resisted the first respondent’s attempts to repossess the premises. We agree with Mr <em>Nkomo</em> that the appellant has continually abused court process and still continues to do so. It is therefore necessary to make an appropriate award of punitive costs.</p> <p>                        In the result, it is ordered that the appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.             </p> <p>                        <strong>GOWORA JA:</strong>                      I agree.</p> <p>                        <strong>ZIYAMBI AJA:</strong>                    I agree.</p> <p><em>Calderwood</em>, <em>Bryce-Hendrie &amp; Partners, </em>1st respondent’s legal practitioners</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-e272911ac83ca03f4bfc819f63715c21316a09060815e3145598f0d8a0ae7c77"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>EX TEMPORE</strong></p> <p><strong>ELPHAS     MAVUNE     MAPHISA </strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO     MUNICIPAL     COMMERCIAL     UNDERTAKING</strong></p> <p><strong>GORDON     GEDDES</strong></p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA, PATEL JA &amp; ZIYAMBI AJA</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO, 27 NOVEMBER 2017</strong></p> <p>The appellant in person</p> <p><em>L. Nkomo</em>, for the first respondent</p> <p>No appearance for the second respondent</p> <p>                        <strong>PATEL JA:   </strong>This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court, dated 13 July 2017, dismissing an application for review of the determination of an arbitrator which had dismissed preliminary issues raised by the appellant relating, <em>inter alia</em>, to the legal status of the first respondent and its capacity to enforce a franchise agreement between the parties.</p> <p>                        The court <em>a quo</em> found that the appellant had proceeded erroneously by not invoking the procedure prescribed for setting aside arbitral awards under Article 34 of the Model Law scheduled to the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>]. The court further found that, even if the application had been mounted in terms of ss 26 and 27 of the High Court Act [<em>Chapter 7:06</em>], the appellant had not alleged any valid grounds of review to set aside the determination of the arbitrator. In our view, we entirely agree with the court <em>a quo </em>that there was no proper review before it. We also take the view that the court should have stopped after making those findings and should not have proceeded to deal with the merits of the review application.</p> <p>                        We note that the appeal herein is stated to be against the whole judgment of the High Court.  However, the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal are confined to the merits of the arbitrator’s determination on the preliminary issues. They do not in any way impugn the main findings of the court relating to its powers of review and the impropriety of the purported review application before it.</p> <p>                        We also note that, following the determination of the arbitrator on the preliminary points, the arbitration proceedings were continued with the active participation of the appellant. The arbitrator then rendered his final award on 3 December 2015. Thereafter, the appellant instituted further review proceedings on 24 May 2016 against the final award. These proceedings were also dismissed by the High Court on 27 October 2016 on the basis that the review was improperly instituted. Both the final award of the arbitrator and the judgment of the High Court remain extant. As was grudgingly conceded by the appellant, this fact renders the present appeal academic and futile.</p> <p>                        As regards costs, Mr <em>Nkomo</em>, for the first respondent, sought costs on a punitive scale.  The reasons therefore were that the appellant has yet to relinquish the franchised premises, notwithstanding his contention that the franchise agreement is a nullity, and that he has obstinately resisted the first respondent’s attempts to repossess the premises. We agree with Mr <em>Nkomo</em> that the appellant has continually abused court process and still continues to do so. It is therefore necessary to make an appropriate award of punitive costs.</p> <p>                        In the result, it is ordered that the appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.             </p> <p>                        <strong>GOWORA JA:</strong>                      I agree.</p> <p>                        <strong>ZIYAMBI AJA:</strong>                    I agree.</p> <p><em>Calderwood</em>, <em>Bryce-Hendrie &amp; Partners, </em>1st respondent’s legal practitioners</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:24 +0000 Anonymous 10091 at http://www.zimlii.org University of Zimbabwe v Jirira & Another (SC 12 of 2018, Chamber Application SC 179 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 12 (15 June 2016); http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2016/12 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">University of Zimbabwe v Jirira &amp; Another (SC 12 of 2018, Chamber Application SC 179 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 12 (15 June 2016);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1459" hreflang="en">Arbitration</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2124" hreflang="x-default">Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2260" hreflang="x-default">enforcement</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/12/2016-zwsc-12.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=30688">2016-zwsc-12.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/12/2016-zwsc-12.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=127574">2016-zwsc-12.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>UNIVERSITY     OF     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <ol><li><strong>KWANELE N.JIRIRA(2)LOUIS MASUKO</strong></li> </ol><p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, 15 JUNE 2016</strong></p> <p><em>R. H. Goba, </em>for the applicant</p> <p><em>K. E. Kadzere, </em>for the respondents</p> <p><strong>IN CHAMBERS</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>       This is a chamber application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court in terms of r 5 (2) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Appeals and References) Rules, 1975.</p> <p>The applicant is a tertiary educational institution incorporated as such under the University of Zimbabwe Act [<em>Chapter 25:16</em>]. Both respondents are its former workers who were employed as research fellows at its Institute of Development Studies. They were dismissed from employment by the disciplinary Tribunal on allegations of misconduct. They are alleged to have wilfully refused to obey a lawful order to be redeployed from the Institute of Development Studies offices to the University campus.</p> <p>Aggrieved by their dismissal from employment they approached the Labour officer complaining of unfair dismissal. The Labour Officer in turn referred their grievance for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in their favour and made an award of reinstatement and in the alternative damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the Arbitration award, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court without success. Unhappy with the decision of the Labour court, the applicant sought leave to appeal to this court. On 5 April 2013 the Labour Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to this Court.</p> <p>The applicant did not however reinstate the respondent as ordered by both the Arbitrator and the Labour Court. As the result the respondents approached the Arbitrator for quantification of damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement. The Arbitrator assessed damages in the amounts of US$156 852.13 and US$134 362. 00, respectively.</p> <p>Aggrieved by the quantification award, the applicant once again appealed against that award to the Labour Court. Despite the appeal, the respondents proceeded to register the award with the High Court for enforcement. A writ of execution and attachment of the applicant’s property was subsequently issued. The applicant made an urgent application for stay of execution without success. It then successfully appealed to this court for stay of execution pending appeal under judgment number SC 6/12.</p> <p>The applicant’s appeal against the quantification award was subsequently dismissed by the Labour Court. Its complaint is that CHIVIZHE J granted the application for dismissal of the appeal without a formal hearing of the appeal. They allege that despite numerous requests the honourable judge failed to provide the applicant with reasons for judgment resulting in the lapse of time stipulated of the intended appeal.</p> <p>                        It therefore became necessary to apply for condonation and extension of time to file an application for leave to apply to this Court. Both parties filed heads of argument. The applicant now alleges that while they were waiting for the set down date of hearing they were surprised to receive a written judgment by HOVE J dismissing the application for leave to appeal to this Court. It is not clear to me but it appears that the matter was subsequently placed before the same judge who then properly heard the application and dismissed the applicant’s claim under judgment LCH/H/472/2011 at page 56 of the record of proceedings. It is this judgment which prompted this application.</p> <p>In terms s 92F (3) of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>], where a judge of the Labour Court refuses to grant leave to appeal, the applicant may seek leave from a judge of this Court. When a judge of the Supreme Court sits in chambers to decide the application for leave to appeal he does not treat the application as an appeal against the refusal to grant leave by the court <em>a quo</em>. He simply decides the matter on the merits as if it was a fresh application before him/her. For that reason while he may consider the criticisms levelled against the judge in the court <em>a quo</em>, these are not overriding considerations because he makes his own independent fresh determination on the basis of the papers and arguments placed before him/her.</p> <p>I now turn to consider the application for leave to appeal to this Court on the merits.</p> <p>An application for leave to appeal to this Court is firmly grounded on the applicant’s prospects of success on appeal.  In terms of s 92F of the Act, appeals from the Labour Court only lie to this Court on a point of law. In that regard the first question for consideration is whether the applicant’s grounds of appeal raise a point of law.</p> <p>The grounds of appeal essentially raises the question whether the applicant was subjected to a fair trial when CHIVIZHE J issued an order under case number LC/H/145/11 without giving reasons for the order which it has branded a judgment.</p> <p>The order is dated 31 October 2012 and it reads:</p> <p>“IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>LC/H/145/11</p> <p>In the matter between:-</p> <p><strong>KWANELE JIRIRA &amp; ANOTHER                                                 Applicants</strong></p> <p><strong>Vs</strong></p> <p><strong>UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE                                          Respondents</strong></p> <p>Before the Honourable B T Chivizhe, President</p> <p><strong>(IN CHAMBERS)</strong></p> <p>Whereupon after reading documents filed of record</p> <p>IT IS ORDERED THAT</p> <p>The application for dismissal of appeal in terms of Rule 19 (3) (a) of the Labour Court Rules be and is hereby granted.”</p> <p>The above order is clearly not a judgment but an order given by the learned judge <em>a quo</em> sitting in chambers. This is so because it does not bear a judgment number or reasons for judgment. It cites no legal representatives signifying that none were heard although both parties had legal representation. This is clearly a default judgment. It is not correct for the applicant to say in its founding affidavit that the learned judge did not give reasons for its judgment. This is because in the same breath it confesses that the judgment was given pursuant to an application for dismissal of its appeal because of its failure to file heads of argument timeously.</p> <p>It is therefore plain that the applicant’s appeal was dismissed for want of compliance with the Rules. Nowhere in its grounds of appeal does the applicant allege that it filed its heads of argument timeously. </p> <p>In my view, the applicant having failed to file its heads of argument within the prescribed time limit, it ought to have applied for rescission of judgment in terms of s 92C. The section confers a wide discretion on a judge of the labour Court to rescind his own decisions including those given in the absence of a party or in error. The section provides as follows:</p> <p>“(1) Subject to this section, the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order—</p> <ul><li>which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made;</li> <li> </li> </ul><p>(<em>b</em>) which the Labour Court is satisfied is void or was obtained by fraud or a mistake common to the parties; or</p> <ul><li>in order to correct any patent error.</li> </ul><p>(2) The Labour Court shall not exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1)–</p> <ul><li>except upon notice to all the parties affected by the determination or order concerned; or</li> <li>in respect of any determination or order which is the subject of a pending appeal or review.</li> </ul><p>(3) Where an application has been made to the Labour Court to rescind or vary any determination or order in terms of subsection (1), the Labour Court may direct that—</p> <ul><li>the determination or order shall be carried into execution; or</li> <li>execution of the determination or order shall be suspended pending the decision upon the application;</li> </ul><p>upon such terms as the Labour Court may fix as to security for the due performance of the determination or order or any variation thereof”</p> <p>That application ought to have been made simultaneously with an application for condonation and extension of time within which to file its heads of argument in terms of r 26 which provides that:</p> <p>“At any time before or during the hearing of a matter a President or the Court may—</p> <p>(<em>a</em>) direct, authorise or condone a departure from any of these rules, including an extension of any period specified therein, where the President or Court is satisfied that the departure is required in the interests</p> <p>of justice, fairness and equity;</p> <p>(<em>b</em>) give such directions as to procedure in respect of any matter not expressly provided for in these rules as</p> <p>appear to the President of the Court to be just, expedient and equitable”</p> <p>In terms of r 33 the applicant had 30 days within which to make the above applications for relief in the court <em>a quo.</em> From the date it became aware of the so called judgment. This it not do. The so called judgment it seeks to impugn is dated 31 October 2012. It only approached this court for relief about two and a half years later on 15 March 2015. That delay in approaching this Court is lengthy and inordinate. It cannot be the kind of delay occasioned by a party who has the serious intention to prosecute its appeal.</p> <p>It appears to me that this Application was lodged as an afterthought, simply to circumvent the court <em>a quo</em> and throw spanners into the pending execution. The applicant could no longer approach the court <em>a quo</em> for relief as it was now woefully out of time. Approaching this Court was an ingenuous way of evading the natural consequences of its inordinate delay in approaching the court <em>a quo</em> for relief timeously.</p> <p>The applicant has not proffered any explanation for the inordinate delay of more than two and a half years before approaching this Court if it was sincere in its belief that the relief it seeks resides in this Court. In any case the applicant ought to have exhausted its domestic remedies before approaching this Court for relief. For the foregoing reasons I come to the conclusion that there is absolutely no merit in this Application it is accordingly ordered that the application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</p> <p><em>Ziumbe &amp; partners, </em>applicant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Hungwe &amp; Mandevere, </em>respondents’ legal practitioners</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-d04ce04380130641d494f4d08df861c51a238379920239eb33d24b6c1319e854"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>UNIVERSITY     OF     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <ol><li><strong>KWANELE N.JIRIRA(2)LOUIS MASUKO</strong></li> </ol><p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, 15 JUNE 2016</strong></p> <p><em>R. H. Goba, </em>for the applicant</p> <p><em>K. E. Kadzere, </em>for the respondents</p> <p><strong>IN CHAMBERS</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>       This is a chamber application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court in terms of r 5 (2) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Appeals and References) Rules, 1975.</p> <p>The applicant is a tertiary educational institution incorporated as such under the University of Zimbabwe Act [<em>Chapter 25:16</em>]. Both respondents are its former workers who were employed as research fellows at its Institute of Development Studies. They were dismissed from employment by the disciplinary Tribunal on allegations of misconduct. They are alleged to have wilfully refused to obey a lawful order to be redeployed from the Institute of Development Studies offices to the University campus.</p> <p>Aggrieved by their dismissal from employment they approached the Labour officer complaining of unfair dismissal. The Labour Officer in turn referred their grievance for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in their favour and made an award of reinstatement and in the alternative damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the Arbitration award, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court without success. Unhappy with the decision of the Labour court, the applicant sought leave to appeal to this court. On 5 April 2013 the Labour Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to this Court.</p> <p>The applicant did not however reinstate the respondent as ordered by both the Arbitrator and the Labour Court. As the result the respondents approached the Arbitrator for quantification of damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement. The Arbitrator assessed damages in the amounts of US$156 852.13 and US$134 362. 00, respectively.</p> <p>Aggrieved by the quantification award, the applicant once again appealed against that award to the Labour Court. Despite the appeal, the respondents proceeded to register the award with the High Court for enforcement. A writ of execution and attachment of the applicant’s property was subsequently issued. The applicant made an urgent application for stay of execution without success. It then successfully appealed to this court for stay of execution pending appeal under judgment number SC 6/12.</p> <p>The applicant’s appeal against the quantification award was subsequently dismissed by the Labour Court. Its complaint is that CHIVIZHE J granted the application for dismissal of the appeal without a formal hearing of the appeal. They allege that despite numerous requests the honourable judge failed to provide the applicant with reasons for judgment resulting in the lapse of time stipulated of the intended appeal.</p> <p>                        It therefore became necessary to apply for condonation and extension of time to file an application for leave to apply to this Court. Both parties filed heads of argument. The applicant now alleges that while they were waiting for the set down date of hearing they were surprised to receive a written judgment by HOVE J dismissing the application for leave to appeal to this Court. It is not clear to me but it appears that the matter was subsequently placed before the same judge who then properly heard the application and dismissed the applicant’s claim under judgment LCH/H/472/2011 at page 56 of the record of proceedings. It is this judgment which prompted this application.</p> <p>In terms s 92F (3) of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>], where a judge of the Labour Court refuses to grant leave to appeal, the applicant may seek leave from a judge of this Court. When a judge of the Supreme Court sits in chambers to decide the application for leave to appeal he does not treat the application as an appeal against the refusal to grant leave by the court <em>a quo</em>. He simply decides the matter on the merits as if it was a fresh application before him/her. For that reason while he may consider the criticisms levelled against the judge in the court <em>a quo</em>, these are not overriding considerations because he makes his own independent fresh determination on the basis of the papers and arguments placed before him/her.</p> <p>I now turn to consider the application for leave to appeal to this Court on the merits.</p> <p>An application for leave to appeal to this Court is firmly grounded on the applicant’s prospects of success on appeal.  In terms of s 92F of the Act, appeals from the Labour Court only lie to this Court on a point of law. In that regard the first question for consideration is whether the applicant’s grounds of appeal raise a point of law.</p> <p>The grounds of appeal essentially raises the question whether the applicant was subjected to a fair trial when CHIVIZHE J issued an order under case number LC/H/145/11 without giving reasons for the order which it has branded a judgment.</p> <p>The order is dated 31 October 2012 and it reads:</p> <p>“IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>LC/H/145/11</p> <p>In the matter between:-</p> <p><strong>KWANELE JIRIRA &amp; ANOTHER                                                 Applicants</strong></p> <p><strong>Vs</strong></p> <p><strong>UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE                                          Respondents</strong></p> <p>Before the Honourable B T Chivizhe, President</p> <p><strong>(IN CHAMBERS)</strong></p> <p>Whereupon after reading documents filed of record</p> <p>IT IS ORDERED THAT</p> <p>The application for dismissal of appeal in terms of Rule 19 (3) (a) of the Labour Court Rules be and is hereby granted.”</p> <p>The above order is clearly not a judgment but an order given by the learned judge <em>a quo</em> sitting in chambers. This is so because it does not bear a judgment number or reasons for judgment. It cites no legal representatives signifying that none were heard although both parties had legal representation. This is clearly a default judgment. It is not correct for the applicant to say in its founding affidavit that the learned judge did not give reasons for its judgment. This is because in the same breath it confesses that the judgment was given pursuant to an application for dismissal of its appeal because of its failure to file heads of argument timeously.</p> <p>It is therefore plain that the applicant’s appeal was dismissed for want of compliance with the Rules. Nowhere in its grounds of appeal does the applicant allege that it filed its heads of argument timeously. </p> <p>In my view, the applicant having failed to file its heads of argument within the prescribed time limit, it ought to have applied for rescission of judgment in terms of s 92C. The section confers a wide discretion on a judge of the labour Court to rescind his own decisions including those given in the absence of a party or in error. The section provides as follows:</p> <p>“(1) Subject to this section, the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order—</p> <ul><li>which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made;</li> <li> </li> </ul><p>(<em>b</em>) which the Labour Court is satisfied is void or was obtained by fraud or a mistake common to the parties; or</p> <ul><li>in order to correct any patent error.</li> </ul><p>(2) The Labour Court shall not exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1)–</p> <ul><li>except upon notice to all the parties affected by the determination or order concerned; or</li> <li>in respect of any determination or order which is the subject of a pending appeal or review.</li> </ul><p>(3) Where an application has been made to the Labour Court to rescind or vary any determination or order in terms of subsection (1), the Labour Court may direct that—</p> <ul><li>the determination or order shall be carried into execution; or</li> <li>execution of the determination or order shall be suspended pending the decision upon the application;</li> </ul><p>upon such terms as the Labour Court may fix as to security for the due performance of the determination or order or any variation thereof”</p> <p>That application ought to have been made simultaneously with an application for condonation and extension of time within which to file its heads of argument in terms of r 26 which provides that:</p> <p>“At any time before or during the hearing of a matter a President or the Court may—</p> <p>(<em>a</em>) direct, authorise or condone a departure from any of these rules, including an extension of any period specified therein, where the President or Court is satisfied that the departure is required in the interests</p> <p>of justice, fairness and equity;</p> <p>(<em>b</em>) give such directions as to procedure in respect of any matter not expressly provided for in these rules as</p> <p>appear to the President of the Court to be just, expedient and equitable”</p> <p>In terms of r 33 the applicant had 30 days within which to make the above applications for relief in the court <em>a quo.</em> From the date it became aware of the so called judgment. This it not do. The so called judgment it seeks to impugn is dated 31 October 2012. It only approached this court for relief about two and a half years later on 15 March 2015. That delay in approaching this Court is lengthy and inordinate. It cannot be the kind of delay occasioned by a party who has the serious intention to prosecute its appeal.</p> <p>It appears to me that this Application was lodged as an afterthought, simply to circumvent the court <em>a quo</em> and throw spanners into the pending execution. The applicant could no longer approach the court <em>a quo</em> for relief as it was now woefully out of time. Approaching this Court was an ingenuous way of evading the natural consequences of its inordinate delay in approaching the court <em>a quo</em> for relief timeously.</p> <p>The applicant has not proffered any explanation for the inordinate delay of more than two and a half years before approaching this Court if it was sincere in its belief that the relief it seeks resides in this Court. In any case the applicant ought to have exhausted its domestic remedies before approaching this Court for relief. For the foregoing reasons I come to the conclusion that there is absolutely no merit in this Application it is accordingly ordered that the application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</p> <p><em>Ziumbe &amp; partners, </em>applicant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Hungwe &amp; Mandevere, </em>respondents’ legal practitioners</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:22 +0000 Anonymous 10089 at http://www.zimlii.org Augur Investments OU v Faircot Investments (Private) Limited t/a T& C Construction & Another (SC 8 of 2019, Civil Appeal SC 170 of ) [2019] ZWSC 8 (11 February 2019); http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2019/8 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Augur Investments OU v Faircot Investments (Private) Limited t/a T&amp; C Construction &amp; Another (SC 8 of 2019, Civil Appeal SC 170 of ) [2019] ZWSC 8 (11 February 2019);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1459" hreflang="en">Arbitration</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1453" hreflang="en">Arbitration agreement</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2294" hreflang="x-default">Arbitrator</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2124" hreflang="x-default">Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2124" hreflang="x-default">Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2159" hreflang="x-default">setting aside award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2159" hreflang="x-default">setting aside award</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:37</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2019/8/2019-zwsc-8.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=47261">2019-zwsc-8.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2019/8/2019-zwsc-8.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=154571">2019-zwsc-8.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>REPORTABLE</strong><strong>     (9)</strong></p> <p><strong>        </strong></p> <p><strong>AUGUR     INVESTMENTS     OU</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>(1)      FAIRCLOT     INVESTMENTS     (PRIVATE)     LIMITED     t/a     T &amp; C     CONSTRUCTION     (2)     D.L.     CRUTTENDEN</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA; MAVANGIRA JA; BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, OCTOBER 16, 2017 &amp; FEBRUARY 11, 2019</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>T. Zhuwarara </em>with<em> N. Chamisa</em>, for the appellant</p> <p><em>D.Ochieng</em>, for the respondents</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA</strong>        </p> <p>[1]        This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant`s application for the setting aside of an arbitral award in terms of Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as set out in the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>].</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>FACTUAL BACKGROUND</strong></p> <p>[2]        The appellant is a company incorporated in terms of the laws of Mauritius and it carries on the business of property finance and development in Zimbabwe. The first respondent is a duly registered company in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe and is in the business of performing civil contracting services. The second respondent is an arbitrator. In June 2008, the appellant was contracted by the City of Harare to manage the upgrading and extension of the Airport Road. By agreement dated 25 and 26 March 2013, the appellant subcontracted the first respondent to carry out civil engineering works on the Airport Road. At the time of entering into the agreement, the appellant acknowledged indebtedness to the first respondent in the sum of US$ 3 340 500 for previous work done and equipment hire charges.</p> <p> </p> <p>[3]        In terms of clauses 1.3 and 3.1 of the agreement, payment to the first respondent for its services was to be by way of land and should the land option fall away, payment was to be made in cash within a limited time period. It was also a term of the agreement that the consideration due to the first respondent was to be payable when the land pledged as security was sold or the appellant was in the position to make a cash payment. It was recorded that the appellant had commenced the rezoning of the land and would use its best endeavours to rezone, subdivide and develop it. It is common cause that the land pledged as security was not registered in the name of the appellant, nor was it sold to realise the amount owed to the first respondent, as envisaged by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, the first respondent carried out works on the Airport Road at the cost of US$ 4 800 000. Despite demand, the appellant refused, failed or neglected to pay the debt due to the first respondent for a period of almost two years then. It is now close to 5 years.</p> <p> </p> <p>[4]        Aggrieved, the first respondent purported to cancel the agreement between the parties by way of a letter dated 14 April 2014 and thereafter a dispute arose.  In terms of the contract, the matter was referred to arbitration before the second respondent. Before the arbitrator, the first respondent sought an award for payment of the US$ 4 800 000 debt or alternatively an order of <em>quantum meruit</em> for work carried out on behalf of the appellant. The first respondent demanded that it be paid in cash and in its statement of claim, gave the reason that the land option had fallen away as evidenced by the appellant’s failure to pay its dues by way of cash, transfer of land or a combination of the two. Further, that the appellant did not in any event, own the land it had tendered as security for the payment of the debt in question. In response, the appellant did not contest the debt but challenged the method of repayment as well as the timing of it.</p> <p> </p> <p>[5]        It would appear that in view of the above, the main issue placed before the arbitrator for determination was whether or not the land option had fallen away and if so whether payment was to be made by way of cash. The arbitrator found for the first respondent and issued the following award:</p> <ol><li>That the respondent shall pay the Claimant US$ 3 340 500,00 (three million five hundred and forty thousand and five hundred United States dollars) not later than Friday 4 April 2015.</li> <li>That the respondent shall pay the Claimant US$ 1 459 500,00 (one million four hundred and fifty-nine thousand and five hundred United States dollars) not later than Thursday 4 June 2015. This payment may be made in land of equivalent value but, whether in cash or land, the payment must be made not later than Thursday 4 June 2015.</li> <li>That the costs of the Arbitration being the Arbitrator`s fee and the costs of the hearing be paid in equal shares by the parties.</li> <li>That the parties shall bear their own legal costs.</li> <li>That the application for an order of <em>quantum meruit</em> fails.</li> </ol><p> </p> <p>[6]        Dissatisfied with the award, the appellant approached the court <em>a quo</em> with an application to set it aside in terms of Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act, on the basis that the award was contrary to public policy as the arbitrator had decided on matters which were not placed before him. This related to the issue of the effect of the cancellation of a contract relating to the land pledged by the appellant <em>in casu</em>, entered into between the appellant and the City of Harare. The court <em>a quo</em> dismissed the application and reasoned that the arbitrator did not deal with issues outside those referred to him and consequently that the award did not offend against public policy. In support of this finding the court <em>a quo</em> held that it was, in fact, the appellant who had introduced the issue of the contract with the City of Harare. The court <em>a quo</em> further found that the second respondent`s decision to award payment in cash was not outrageous since the land used as security did not belong to the appellant. </p> <p> </p> <p>[7]        Aggrieved by this order, the appellant noted an appeal to this Court on grounds that in my view raise two questions for determination, and these are:</p> <p>1.   Whether or not the arbitrator decided on issues that were not placed before him;                and</p> <ol><li>Whether or not the arbitral award was contrary to public policy.</li> </ol><p> </p> <p><strong>THE APPELLANT`S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL</strong></p> <p>[8]        It was argued for the appellant that it was common cause that payment due to the first respondent was to be made in land rather than in cash. It was also argued that the statement of claim by the first respondent set out the case that the agreement had been terminated and since the land used as security was not registered in the appellant`s name, the land option had fallen away. The appellant claims that this is the case it was supposed to meet and answer at the arbitration proceedings but however the second respondent found for the first respondent by making out a case that had neither been pleaded nor argued. In particular, the appellant took issue with the fact that the second respondent found that as the main contract between the appellant and the City of Harare had been terminated, the agreement between the parties effectively came to an end. That was never the case that was pleaded or argued by the first respondent. It was therefore alleged that the second respondent made out a case for the first respondent and substituted the first respondent`s cause of action with his own, resulting in fundamental injustice which was also an affront to the public policy of Zimbabwe.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>THE RESPONDENTS` ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL</strong></p> <p>[9]        The first respondent argued that the appellant is not disputing the debt owed to it which has been outstanding for a number of years. It was also argued that the appellant exhibited dishonourable conduct by offering land which did not belong to it as “security” for the repayment of the debt. This was because the land could not be sold and was thus never at any point, security for the debt.  The first respondent also denies that the award is contrary to public policy and stresses that the appellant undertook to pay the debt by June or July 2014 through a transfer of land but this has not been done. As a result, the US$ 4 800 000 remains owing.  As regards the argument that the arbitrator dealt with issues not before him, the first respondent argued that the arbitrator correctly identified the issues for determination and one of these was whether or not the land option had fallen away.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>WHETHER OR NOT THE ARBITRATOR DECIDED ON ISSUES THAT WERE NOT BEFORE HIM</strong></p> <p>[10]      It is the appellant`s argument that the second respondent went outside his terms of reference and raised <em>mero motu</em> the issue of the cancellation of the contract between the appellant and the City of Harare. The argument is that this issue was neither raised nor argued by the parties thus the second respondent ought not to have made a pronouncement on it or premised his arbitral award thereon.</p> <p> </p> <p>[11]      The arbitrator did indeed find that the agreement between the parties was terminated by virtue of the termination of the main contract between the appellant and the City of Harare. However, in his award, the arbitrator pointed out that there was on the record before him minutes of a meeting between the appellant and a third party, which recorded the fact of such termination. Further, that the document had been prepared by the appellant, and was introduced at the hearing before the arbitrator, with no objections being raised. The court <em>a quo</em> also noted that a copy of the agreement in question, between the appellant and the City of Harare, was part of the record before that court.</p> <p>Thus, far from finding that the arbitrator had dealt with issues falling outside his terms of reference, the court <em>a quo</em> stated as follows in its judgment:</p> <p>“I have perused the statement of claim and response. It is the applicant (appellant <em>in casu</em>) in its response which introduced the issue of its contract with the City of Harare ….</p> <p>On page 299 of the record is an agreement between City of Harare and the applicant.</p> <p>I therefore fail to understand the complaint by the applicant. It is my view that the arbitrator did not deal with issues outside referral.”</p> <p>           </p> <p>            Against this background, it is in my view correctly argued for the first respondent that the arbitrator pronounced on, and premised his finding as to, the termination of the agreement between the parties, based on evidence and submissions that were clearly placed before him.</p> <p> </p> <p>[12]     The first respondent argues that in any case whether or not the agreement was alive was irrelevant to the question of whether payment in cash was due. In terms of clause 3.1 of the agreement, so the argument goes, the ‘cash settlement’ was to come into effect only upon the land option falling away, a conclusion that the arbitrator duly pronounced. I am persuaded by this argument, not least because the appellant itself indicated that it understood the ‘land falling away’ option, as an alternative basis for the claim filed against it. This much is made clear on a reading of para 9 of the appellant’s founding affidavit <em>a quo</em>:</p> <p>“First respondent claimed payment in the sum of US$4.8 million based on a written agreement. As appears from the statement of claim, it was alleged that the agreement had been cancelled or alternatively, the land option envisaged by the parties had fallen away…”   (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p>[13]      A perusal of the first respondent`s statement of claim confirms the appellant’s assessment of the first respondent’s claim. The point was clearly made in its statement of claim, that the land which had been used as security for the debt did not belong to the appellant and thus did not constitute valid security. Further that as a result, the land option had fallen away. The relevant part of the statement of claim reads as follows:</p> <p>            “25.     In an email dated 11 September 2014 (enclosed as Annexure 14) T&amp;C       offered to settle the outstanding debt with Augur by way of (a) cash    payment, or (b) by way of transfer of ownership of land to T&amp;C or (c) a             combination of the two. Augur failed to respondent to this proposal.</p> <p> </p> <p>            26.       In the circumstances, the “land option” has   fallen away as Augur does      not own the land it secured and, further, Augur has not consented           to         the transfer of land to T&amp;C. In fact, T&amp;C is unaware whether Augur        owns any land.</p> <p> </p> <p>            27.       Pursuant to clauses 3.1, 6.1B and 6.3 the       admitted debt of          US$ 4.8 million is due and owing.” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p> </p> <p>[14]      That the issue of the land option was uppermost in the arbitrator’s mind is confirmed in the following concise statement contained in his award:</p> <p>“The particular issues are whether or not the ‘land option’ has fallen away and what is the duration of the ‘limited time period’ both as identified in clause 3.1. In my view these are inextricably linked.”</p> <p> </p> <p>Thus, while the second respondent opined that the termination of the main contract between the City of Harare and the appellant had the effect of terminating the agreement between the appellant and the first respondent, he also considered the land issue, including the timing of the cash payment.  He found that the land option in respect of ‘the old debt,’ unlike the ‘new debt,’ had indeed fallen away. His conclusions are clearly premised on this finding as stated in para 5.5 and 5.5(<em>sic</em>) of the arbitral award:</p> <p>            5.5       As set out in 4.21 above, I consider the respondent has had more than         adequate time to demonstrate progress towards settling this    debt.    Accordingly, I conclude that the land option has fallen away in respect            of the old debt and that the time has come for a cash payment.</p> <p>            5.5       So far as the new debt is concerned I consider that sufficient time has         not yet elapsed to enable me to consider that the land option has fallen       away and I shall make allowance for this in the award.</p> <p> </p> <p>[15]      It would appear from his award though, that the arbitrator used the estimated date of the termination of the contract between the parties, as an aid in assessing whether or not adequate time to demonstrate progress towards settling the debt in terms of para 3.1 of the agreement, had elapsed.  I do not find anything amiss in this approach, given that the evidence was there before him and that he could, in any case have made the same assessment of time without reference to the supposed date of the termination of the parties’ agreement. The arbitrator was not called upon to determine the date from which the land option could be considered as having fallen away. All he had to do was determine whether ‘a limited time period’ had elapsed from the time events on the ground suggested to the first respondent that the land option had fallen away. The first respondent’s statement of claim in my view was instructive in that respect.</p> <p> </p> <p>[16]      It is accepted that an arbitrator, unlike a court of law, is not allowed to venture outside their terms of reference when making a determination, as highlighted as follows by FOURIE J, in <em>Bidoli v Bidoli</em> [2010] ZAWCHC 39 at 30:</p> <p>“An arbitrator, unlike a court, has no inherent power to decide issues or make orders that go beyond the issues which have been referred to arbitration and the pleadings filed pursuant thereto. In <em>Hos+Med Medical Aid Scheme v Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Marketing &amp; Consulting (Pvt) Ltd and Others</em> [2007] ZASCA 163; 2008 (2) SA 608 (SCA), LEWIS JA put it as follows at para 30:</p> <p>            "In my view it is clear that the only source of an arbitrator's power is          the arbitration       agreement between the parties and an arbitrator        cannot stray beyond their submission where the parties have expressly             defined and limited the issues, as the parties have done in this case to         the matters pleaded. Thus the arbitrator... had no jurisdiction to decide a           matter not pleaded."</p> <p> </p> <p>(See also <em>Inter Agric (Pvt) Ltd v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors</em> SC 09/15)</p> <p>[17]      The appellant itself acknowledges that the issue of mode of payment to the first respondent was key to a resolution of the dispute and stated the following in its Answering Affidavit to the application in the court <em>a quo</em>:</p> <p>“A genuine dispute existed between the parties. The central issue was whether or not the First Respondent was entitled to payment in a form other than land, and if so, when such payment was to be made.”</p> <p> </p> <p>In view of the foregoing, I find that the appellant’s submission that the second respondent made a case for the parties and premised his findings on issues that were not before him, to be without any basis. The point must be made that even if the arbitrator had indeed premised his award also on the finding that the contract between the City Council and the appellant automatically terminated the parties’ contract, the validity of the conclusion would still stand. It is at law not uncommon for a single determination to be premised on more than one finding in the same dispute.</p> <p>            This issue is accordingly determined against the appellant.</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY</strong></p> <p>[18]      In terms of the law, an arbitral award can be set aside in terms Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as set out in the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>].  It reads as follows in relevant part:</p> <p>“(2)      An arbitral award may be set aside by the High Court only if;</p> <ol><li> </li> </ol><p>                                    . . .</p> <ul><li>the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or</li> </ul><p>. . .</p> <p>                                    (b)        the High Court finds that—</p> <p> </p> <ul><li>the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of Zimbabwe; or</li> <li>the award is in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe.” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</li> </ul><p> </p> <p>[19]      The test to be applied in determining whether an award is in conflict with public policy was set out by this Court in <em>Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority v Maposa</em> 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S) at 466 E-G where GUBBAY CJ said:</p> <p>“Under article 34 or 36, the court does not exercise an appeal power and either uphold or set aside or decline to recognise and enforce an award by having regard to what it considers should have been the correct decision. Where, however, the reasoning or conclusion in an award goes beyond mere faultiness or incorrectness and constitutes a palpable inequity that is so far reaching and outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that a sensible and fair minded person would consider that the conception of justice in Zimbabwe would be intolerably hurt by the award, then it would be contrary to public policy to uphold it.</p> <p>The same consequence applies where the arbitrator has not applied his mind to the question or has totally misunderstood the issue, and the resultant injustice reaches the point mentioned above.”</p> <p> </p> <p>[20]      The gravamen of the appellant`s attack on the arbitral award is that the second respondent made a case for the first respondent by considering an alternative and completely unfounded basis upon which the appellant`s liability was premised, that is the termination of its contract with City of Harare.</p> <p> </p> <p>[21]      I have already determined, as did the court <em>a quo</em>, that there is no basis to the above           allegation. On the evidence before the court, the arbitrator’s determination clearly did             not turn on the issue concerning the effect that the cancellation of the agreement             between the appellant and Harare City Council might have had on the parties’          agreement. This was   notwithstanding the fact that the matter had been placed before      the arbitrator by the appellant itself. Rather, and as demonstrated above, the             determination properly turned on the issue of whether or not the land option had fallen      away.  That being the case, I find that the applicant failed to furnish proof, as required in terms of Article 34(2) of the Model Law, that the award dealt with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, nor that      it contained decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.</p> <p> </p> <p>[22]      To the extent that the appellant may be questioning the correctness of the conclusions that were reached by the second respondent, it is settled that in setting aside an award, the court is not concerned with its correctness. Rather the concern of the court is whether or not the award goes beyond mere faultiness to constitute a palpable inequity. In <em>Peruke Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Willoughby`s Investments (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Anor</em> 2015 (2) ZLR 491 (S) at 499H-500F PATEL JA held as follows:</p> <p>“As a rule, the courts are generally loath to invoke this ground except in the most glaring instances of illogicality, injustice or moral turpitude.  In the words of GUBBAY CJ in the <em>locus classicus</em> on the subject, <em>ZESA</em> v <em>Maposa</em> 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S) at 465D-E:</p> <p> </p> <p>“In my opinion, the approach to be adopted is to construe the public policy defence, as being applicable to either a foreign or domestic award, restrictively in order to preserve and recognise the basic objective of finality in all arbitrations; and to hold such defence applicable only if some fundamental principle of the law or morality or justice is violated.”</p> <p> </p> <p>In that case the learned judge went on to state that he could not find anything outrageously illogical or immoral in the reasoning or conclusions reached by the arbitrator, to warrant a different conclusion.</p> <p> </p> <p>[23]      I respectfully associate myself with the sentiments of the learned judge in this case and find that they may properly be applied to the circumstances of this case.  There is no indication in <em>casu</em>, and based on the circumstances, that the second respondent`s award is irrational or outrageously immoral or illogical. (See also <em>Zesa v Maposa </em>1992(2) ZLR 452(S)).</p> <p> </p> <p>[24]      It is pertinent to reiterate that from the time that the dispute arose right up to the appeal     before this Court, the appellant has not disputed that it owes the first   respondent money        for work done, in the amount of US$ 4 800 000.  Nor can the appellant deny that payment of this amount to the first respondent, in cash, was within the contemplation    of the parties. This is put beyond doubt if regard is had to para 3.1 of their agreement,      which reads as follows:</p> <p>“Should the land option fall away then a limited time period will apply for the cash settlement to come into effect. T &amp; C Construction will have the option to opt out of the land security if so required” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p> </p> <p>[25]      In the premises and given that in terms of the arbitrator’s award, the appellant was ordered to pay a sum of money that it admitted to owing, the argument that such an award is contrary to public policy, is clearly not sustainable. The award is not one to be characterised as having far reaching public consequences that would hurt the conception of justice in Zimbabwe. Nor can it be said to have violated a fundamental principle of the law, morality or justice. The contrary could be said to be true, given that the first respondent performed its part of the contract and in the process, incurred expenses running into millions of dollars. These expenses have still not been paid close to 5 years after the contract was entered into.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>DISPOSITION</strong></p> <p>[26]      The court <em>a quo</em> cannot be faulted in its finding that no case had been proved for the          setting aside of the arbitral award of the second respondent<strong>. </strong>As demonstrated above,<strong>      </strong>the award is not in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe. The appeal has no merit            and ought to fail.</p> <p> </p> <p>[27]      Accordingly, it is ordered as follows:</p> <p>                        “The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA:</strong>               I agree</p> <p>    </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>                           I agree</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><em>Costa &amp; Madzonga</em>, appellant`s legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> <p><em>Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans</em>, respondents` legal practitioners</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-fe48ee328c36031ef0daba674d8a61a4c63c3429a0a07539340a7a8981011fe6"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>REPORTABLE</strong><strong>     (9)</strong></p> <p><strong>        </strong></p> <p><strong>AUGUR     INVESTMENTS     OU</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>(1)      FAIRCLOT     INVESTMENTS     (PRIVATE)     LIMITED     t/a     T &amp; C     CONSTRUCTION     (2)     D.L.     CRUTTENDEN</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA; MAVANGIRA JA; BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, OCTOBER 16, 2017 &amp; FEBRUARY 11, 2019</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>T. Zhuwarara </em>with<em> N. Chamisa</em>, for the appellant</p> <p><em>D.Ochieng</em>, for the respondents</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA</strong>        </p> <p>[1]        This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant`s application for the setting aside of an arbitral award in terms of Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as set out in the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>].</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>FACTUAL BACKGROUND</strong></p> <p>[2]        The appellant is a company incorporated in terms of the laws of Mauritius and it carries on the business of property finance and development in Zimbabwe. The first respondent is a duly registered company in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe and is in the business of performing civil contracting services. The second respondent is an arbitrator. In June 2008, the appellant was contracted by the City of Harare to manage the upgrading and extension of the Airport Road. By agreement dated 25 and 26 March 2013, the appellant subcontracted the first respondent to carry out civil engineering works on the Airport Road. At the time of entering into the agreement, the appellant acknowledged indebtedness to the first respondent in the sum of US$ 3 340 500 for previous work done and equipment hire charges.</p> <p> </p> <p>[3]        In terms of clauses 1.3 and 3.1 of the agreement, payment to the first respondent for its services was to be by way of land and should the land option fall away, payment was to be made in cash within a limited time period. It was also a term of the agreement that the consideration due to the first respondent was to be payable when the land pledged as security was sold or the appellant was in the position to make a cash payment. It was recorded that the appellant had commenced the rezoning of the land and would use its best endeavours to rezone, subdivide and develop it. It is common cause that the land pledged as security was not registered in the name of the appellant, nor was it sold to realise the amount owed to the first respondent, as envisaged by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, the first respondent carried out works on the Airport Road at the cost of US$ 4 800 000. Despite demand, the appellant refused, failed or neglected to pay the debt due to the first respondent for a period of almost two years then. It is now close to 5 years.</p> <p> </p> <p>[4]        Aggrieved, the first respondent purported to cancel the agreement between the parties by way of a letter dated 14 April 2014 and thereafter a dispute arose.  In terms of the contract, the matter was referred to arbitration before the second respondent. Before the arbitrator, the first respondent sought an award for payment of the US$ 4 800 000 debt or alternatively an order of <em>quantum meruit</em> for work carried out on behalf of the appellant. The first respondent demanded that it be paid in cash and in its statement of claim, gave the reason that the land option had fallen away as evidenced by the appellant’s failure to pay its dues by way of cash, transfer of land or a combination of the two. Further, that the appellant did not in any event, own the land it had tendered as security for the payment of the debt in question. In response, the appellant did not contest the debt but challenged the method of repayment as well as the timing of it.</p> <p> </p> <p>[5]        It would appear that in view of the above, the main issue placed before the arbitrator for determination was whether or not the land option had fallen away and if so whether payment was to be made by way of cash. The arbitrator found for the first respondent and issued the following award:</p> <ol><li>That the respondent shall pay the Claimant US$ 3 340 500,00 (three million five hundred and forty thousand and five hundred United States dollars) not later than Friday 4 April 2015.</li> <li>That the respondent shall pay the Claimant US$ 1 459 500,00 (one million four hundred and fifty-nine thousand and five hundred United States dollars) not later than Thursday 4 June 2015. This payment may be made in land of equivalent value but, whether in cash or land, the payment must be made not later than Thursday 4 June 2015.</li> <li>That the costs of the Arbitration being the Arbitrator`s fee and the costs of the hearing be paid in equal shares by the parties.</li> <li>That the parties shall bear their own legal costs.</li> <li>That the application for an order of <em>quantum meruit</em> fails.</li> </ol><p> </p> <p>[6]        Dissatisfied with the award, the appellant approached the court <em>a quo</em> with an application to set it aside in terms of Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act, on the basis that the award was contrary to public policy as the arbitrator had decided on matters which were not placed before him. This related to the issue of the effect of the cancellation of a contract relating to the land pledged by the appellant <em>in casu</em>, entered into between the appellant and the City of Harare. The court <em>a quo</em> dismissed the application and reasoned that the arbitrator did not deal with issues outside those referred to him and consequently that the award did not offend against public policy. In support of this finding the court <em>a quo</em> held that it was, in fact, the appellant who had introduced the issue of the contract with the City of Harare. The court <em>a quo</em> further found that the second respondent`s decision to award payment in cash was not outrageous since the land used as security did not belong to the appellant. </p> <p> </p> <p>[7]        Aggrieved by this order, the appellant noted an appeal to this Court on grounds that in my view raise two questions for determination, and these are:</p> <p>1.   Whether or not the arbitrator decided on issues that were not placed before him;                and</p> <ol><li>Whether or not the arbitral award was contrary to public policy.</li> </ol><p> </p> <p><strong>THE APPELLANT`S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL</strong></p> <p>[8]        It was argued for the appellant that it was common cause that payment due to the first respondent was to be made in land rather than in cash. It was also argued that the statement of claim by the first respondent set out the case that the agreement had been terminated and since the land used as security was not registered in the appellant`s name, the land option had fallen away. The appellant claims that this is the case it was supposed to meet and answer at the arbitration proceedings but however the second respondent found for the first respondent by making out a case that had neither been pleaded nor argued. In particular, the appellant took issue with the fact that the second respondent found that as the main contract between the appellant and the City of Harare had been terminated, the agreement between the parties effectively came to an end. That was never the case that was pleaded or argued by the first respondent. It was therefore alleged that the second respondent made out a case for the first respondent and substituted the first respondent`s cause of action with his own, resulting in fundamental injustice which was also an affront to the public policy of Zimbabwe.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>THE RESPONDENTS` ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL</strong></p> <p>[9]        The first respondent argued that the appellant is not disputing the debt owed to it which has been outstanding for a number of years. It was also argued that the appellant exhibited dishonourable conduct by offering land which did not belong to it as “security” for the repayment of the debt. This was because the land could not be sold and was thus never at any point, security for the debt.  The first respondent also denies that the award is contrary to public policy and stresses that the appellant undertook to pay the debt by June or July 2014 through a transfer of land but this has not been done. As a result, the US$ 4 800 000 remains owing.  As regards the argument that the arbitrator dealt with issues not before him, the first respondent argued that the arbitrator correctly identified the issues for determination and one of these was whether or not the land option had fallen away.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>WHETHER OR NOT THE ARBITRATOR DECIDED ON ISSUES THAT WERE NOT BEFORE HIM</strong></p> <p>[10]      It is the appellant`s argument that the second respondent went outside his terms of reference and raised <em>mero motu</em> the issue of the cancellation of the contract between the appellant and the City of Harare. The argument is that this issue was neither raised nor argued by the parties thus the second respondent ought not to have made a pronouncement on it or premised his arbitral award thereon.</p> <p> </p> <p>[11]      The arbitrator did indeed find that the agreement between the parties was terminated by virtue of the termination of the main contract between the appellant and the City of Harare. However, in his award, the arbitrator pointed out that there was on the record before him minutes of a meeting between the appellant and a third party, which recorded the fact of such termination. Further, that the document had been prepared by the appellant, and was introduced at the hearing before the arbitrator, with no objections being raised. The court <em>a quo</em> also noted that a copy of the agreement in question, between the appellant and the City of Harare, was part of the record before that court.</p> <p>Thus, far from finding that the arbitrator had dealt with issues falling outside his terms of reference, the court <em>a quo</em> stated as follows in its judgment:</p> <p>“I have perused the statement of claim and response. It is the applicant (appellant <em>in casu</em>) in its response which introduced the issue of its contract with the City of Harare ….</p> <p>On page 299 of the record is an agreement between City of Harare and the applicant.</p> <p>I therefore fail to understand the complaint by the applicant. It is my view that the arbitrator did not deal with issues outside referral.”</p> <p>           </p> <p>            Against this background, it is in my view correctly argued for the first respondent that the arbitrator pronounced on, and premised his finding as to, the termination of the agreement between the parties, based on evidence and submissions that were clearly placed before him.</p> <p> </p> <p>[12]     The first respondent argues that in any case whether or not the agreement was alive was irrelevant to the question of whether payment in cash was due. In terms of clause 3.1 of the agreement, so the argument goes, the ‘cash settlement’ was to come into effect only upon the land option falling away, a conclusion that the arbitrator duly pronounced. I am persuaded by this argument, not least because the appellant itself indicated that it understood the ‘land falling away’ option, as an alternative basis for the claim filed against it. This much is made clear on a reading of para 9 of the appellant’s founding affidavit <em>a quo</em>:</p> <p>“First respondent claimed payment in the sum of US$4.8 million based on a written agreement. As appears from the statement of claim, it was alleged that the agreement had been cancelled or alternatively, the land option envisaged by the parties had fallen away…”   (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p>[13]      A perusal of the first respondent`s statement of claim confirms the appellant’s assessment of the first respondent’s claim. The point was clearly made in its statement of claim, that the land which had been used as security for the debt did not belong to the appellant and thus did not constitute valid security. Further that as a result, the land option had fallen away. The relevant part of the statement of claim reads as follows:</p> <p>            “25.     In an email dated 11 September 2014 (enclosed as Annexure 14) T&amp;C       offered to settle the outstanding debt with Augur by way of (a) cash    payment, or (b) by way of transfer of ownership of land to T&amp;C or (c) a             combination of the two. Augur failed to respondent to this proposal.</p> <p> </p> <p>            26.       In the circumstances, the “land option” has   fallen away as Augur does      not own the land it secured and, further, Augur has not consented           to         the transfer of land to T&amp;C. In fact, T&amp;C is unaware whether Augur        owns any land.</p> <p> </p> <p>            27.       Pursuant to clauses 3.1, 6.1B and 6.3 the       admitted debt of          US$ 4.8 million is due and owing.” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p> </p> <p>[14]      That the issue of the land option was uppermost in the arbitrator’s mind is confirmed in the following concise statement contained in his award:</p> <p>“The particular issues are whether or not the ‘land option’ has fallen away and what is the duration of the ‘limited time period’ both as identified in clause 3.1. In my view these are inextricably linked.”</p> <p> </p> <p>Thus, while the second respondent opined that the termination of the main contract between the City of Harare and the appellant had the effect of terminating the agreement between the appellant and the first respondent, he also considered the land issue, including the timing of the cash payment.  He found that the land option in respect of ‘the old debt,’ unlike the ‘new debt,’ had indeed fallen away. His conclusions are clearly premised on this finding as stated in para 5.5 and 5.5(<em>sic</em>) of the arbitral award:</p> <p>            5.5       As set out in 4.21 above, I consider the respondent has had more than         adequate time to demonstrate progress towards settling this    debt.    Accordingly, I conclude that the land option has fallen away in respect            of the old debt and that the time has come for a cash payment.</p> <p>            5.5       So far as the new debt is concerned I consider that sufficient time has         not yet elapsed to enable me to consider that the land option has fallen       away and I shall make allowance for this in the award.</p> <p> </p> <p>[15]      It would appear from his award though, that the arbitrator used the estimated date of the termination of the contract between the parties, as an aid in assessing whether or not adequate time to demonstrate progress towards settling the debt in terms of para 3.1 of the agreement, had elapsed.  I do not find anything amiss in this approach, given that the evidence was there before him and that he could, in any case have made the same assessment of time without reference to the supposed date of the termination of the parties’ agreement. The arbitrator was not called upon to determine the date from which the land option could be considered as having fallen away. All he had to do was determine whether ‘a limited time period’ had elapsed from the time events on the ground suggested to the first respondent that the land option had fallen away. The first respondent’s statement of claim in my view was instructive in that respect.</p> <p> </p> <p>[16]      It is accepted that an arbitrator, unlike a court of law, is not allowed to venture outside their terms of reference when making a determination, as highlighted as follows by FOURIE J, in <em>Bidoli v Bidoli</em> [2010] ZAWCHC 39 at 30:</p> <p>“An arbitrator, unlike a court, has no inherent power to decide issues or make orders that go beyond the issues which have been referred to arbitration and the pleadings filed pursuant thereto. In <em>Hos+Med Medical Aid Scheme v Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Marketing &amp; Consulting (Pvt) Ltd and Others</em> [2007] ZASCA 163; 2008 (2) SA 608 (SCA), LEWIS JA put it as follows at para 30:</p> <p>            "In my view it is clear that the only source of an arbitrator's power is          the arbitration       agreement between the parties and an arbitrator        cannot stray beyond their submission where the parties have expressly             defined and limited the issues, as the parties have done in this case to         the matters pleaded. Thus the arbitrator... had no jurisdiction to decide a           matter not pleaded."</p> <p> </p> <p>(See also <em>Inter Agric (Pvt) Ltd v Mudavanhu &amp; Ors</em> SC 09/15)</p> <p>[17]      The appellant itself acknowledges that the issue of mode of payment to the first respondent was key to a resolution of the dispute and stated the following in its Answering Affidavit to the application in the court <em>a quo</em>:</p> <p>“A genuine dispute existed between the parties. The central issue was whether or not the First Respondent was entitled to payment in a form other than land, and if so, when such payment was to be made.”</p> <p> </p> <p>In view of the foregoing, I find that the appellant’s submission that the second respondent made a case for the parties and premised his findings on issues that were not before him, to be without any basis. The point must be made that even if the arbitrator had indeed premised his award also on the finding that the contract between the City Council and the appellant automatically terminated the parties’ contract, the validity of the conclusion would still stand. It is at law not uncommon for a single determination to be premised on more than one finding in the same dispute.</p> <p>            This issue is accordingly determined against the appellant.</p> <p>  </p> <p><strong>WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY</strong></p> <p>[18]      In terms of the law, an arbitral award can be set aside in terms Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as set out in the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act [<em>Chapter 7:15</em>].  It reads as follows in relevant part:</p> <p>“(2)      An arbitral award may be set aside by the High Court only if;</p> <ol><li> </li> </ol><p>                                    . . .</p> <ul><li>the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or</li> </ul><p>. . .</p> <p>                                    (b)        the High Court finds that—</p> <p> </p> <ul><li>the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of Zimbabwe; or</li> <li>the award is in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe.” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</li> </ul><p> </p> <p>[19]      The test to be applied in determining whether an award is in conflict with public policy was set out by this Court in <em>Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority v Maposa</em> 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S) at 466 E-G where GUBBAY CJ said:</p> <p>“Under article 34 or 36, the court does not exercise an appeal power and either uphold or set aside or decline to recognise and enforce an award by having regard to what it considers should have been the correct decision. Where, however, the reasoning or conclusion in an award goes beyond mere faultiness or incorrectness and constitutes a palpable inequity that is so far reaching and outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that a sensible and fair minded person would consider that the conception of justice in Zimbabwe would be intolerably hurt by the award, then it would be contrary to public policy to uphold it.</p> <p>The same consequence applies where the arbitrator has not applied his mind to the question or has totally misunderstood the issue, and the resultant injustice reaches the point mentioned above.”</p> <p> </p> <p>[20]      The gravamen of the appellant`s attack on the arbitral award is that the second respondent made a case for the first respondent by considering an alternative and completely unfounded basis upon which the appellant`s liability was premised, that is the termination of its contract with City of Harare.</p> <p> </p> <p>[21]      I have already determined, as did the court <em>a quo</em>, that there is no basis to the above           allegation. On the evidence before the court, the arbitrator’s determination clearly did             not turn on the issue concerning the effect that the cancellation of the agreement             between the appellant and Harare City Council might have had on the parties’          agreement. This was   notwithstanding the fact that the matter had been placed before      the arbitrator by the appellant itself. Rather, and as demonstrated above, the             determination properly turned on the issue of whether or not the land option had fallen      away.  That being the case, I find that the applicant failed to furnish proof, as required in terms of Article 34(2) of the Model Law, that the award dealt with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, nor that      it contained decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.</p> <p> </p> <p>[22]      To the extent that the appellant may be questioning the correctness of the conclusions that were reached by the second respondent, it is settled that in setting aside an award, the court is not concerned with its correctness. Rather the concern of the court is whether or not the award goes beyond mere faultiness to constitute a palpable inequity. In <em>Peruke Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Willoughby`s Investments (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Anor</em> 2015 (2) ZLR 491 (S) at 499H-500F PATEL JA held as follows:</p> <p>“As a rule, the courts are generally loath to invoke this ground except in the most glaring instances of illogicality, injustice or moral turpitude.  In the words of GUBBAY CJ in the <em>locus classicus</em> on the subject, <em>ZESA</em> v <em>Maposa</em> 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S) at 465D-E:</p> <p> </p> <p>“In my opinion, the approach to be adopted is to construe the public policy defence, as being applicable to either a foreign or domestic award, restrictively in order to preserve and recognise the basic objective of finality in all arbitrations; and to hold such defence applicable only if some fundamental principle of the law or morality or justice is violated.”</p> <p> </p> <p>In that case the learned judge went on to state that he could not find anything outrageously illogical or immoral in the reasoning or conclusions reached by the arbitrator, to warrant a different conclusion.</p> <p> </p> <p>[23]      I respectfully associate myself with the sentiments of the learned judge in this case and find that they may properly be applied to the circumstances of this case.  There is no indication in <em>casu</em>, and based on the circumstances, that the second respondent`s award is irrational or outrageously immoral or illogical. (See also <em>Zesa v Maposa </em>1992(2) ZLR 452(S)).</p> <p> </p> <p>[24]      It is pertinent to reiterate that from the time that the dispute arose right up to the appeal     before this Court, the appellant has not disputed that it owes the first   respondent money        for work done, in the amount of US$ 4 800 000.  Nor can the appellant deny that payment of this amount to the first respondent, in cash, was within the contemplation    of the parties. This is put beyond doubt if regard is had to para 3.1 of their agreement,      which reads as follows:</p> <p>“Should the land option fall away then a limited time period will apply for the cash settlement to come into effect. T &amp; C Construction will have the option to opt out of the land security if so required” (<em>my emphasis</em>)</p> <p> </p> <p>[25]      In the premises and given that in terms of the arbitrator’s award, the appellant was ordered to pay a sum of money that it admitted to owing, the argument that such an award is contrary to public policy, is clearly not sustainable. The award is not one to be characterised as having far reaching public consequences that would hurt the conception of justice in Zimbabwe. Nor can it be said to have violated a fundamental principle of the law, morality or justice. The contrary could be said to be true, given that the first respondent performed its part of the contract and in the process, incurred expenses running into millions of dollars. These expenses have still not been paid close to 5 years after the contract was entered into.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>DISPOSITION</strong></p> <p>[26]      The court <em>a quo</em> cannot be faulted in its finding that no case had been proved for the          setting aside of the arbitral award of the second respondent<strong>. </strong>As demonstrated above,<strong>      </strong>the award is not in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe. The appeal has no merit            and ought to fail.</p> <p> </p> <p>[27]      Accordingly, it is ordered as follows:</p> <p>                        “The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA:</strong>               I agree</p> <p>    </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>                           I agree</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><em>Costa &amp; Madzonga</em>, appellant`s legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> <p><em>Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans</em>, respondents` legal practitioners</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:37:38 +0000 Anonymous 10020 at http://www.zimlii.org